University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Articles

Faculty Publications and Presentations

2010

Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform
Xuan-Thao Nguyen
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L. J. 449 (2010),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/883

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Presentations at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reformt
XUAN-THAO NGUYEN*
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................
I. THE "BROKEN" PATENT SYSTEM ........................................................................
II. LOCAL PATENT REFORM AND DYNAMIC FEDERALISM .......................................
III. RACE TO THE TOP FOR PATENT REFORM ..........................................................
A. THE SUPREME COURT AND PATENT REFORM ...........................................
B. CONGRESS AND PATENT REFORM .............................................................
IV. LOCALISM AND PATENT REFORM .....................................................................
A. A LOCAL MOVEMENT FOR LOCAL PATENT RULES ...................................
B. DISTRICT JUDGES: INSTRUMENTAL TO LOCAL PATENT REFORM ...............
C. OTHER IMPACTS FROM LOCAL PATENT REFORM ......................................
V. PUNISHING INNOVATIVE LOCAL REFORM ..........................................................
CON CLU SION ..........................................................................................................

449
453
456
460
460
467
472
472
477
481
483
489

Patent law is federal law, and the normative approachto patent reform has been
top down, looking to Congress and the Supreme Courtfor changes to the broken and
complex patent system. The normative approachthusfar has not yielded satisfactory
results. This Article challenges the static approachto patentreform and embraces the
dynamic-federalism approach that patent reform can be an overlapping of both
national and local efforts. Patentreform at the local level is essential as locales can
serve as laboratoriesfor changes, vertically compete with national government to
reform certainareas of the patentsystem, and become influentialcatalystsfor changes
that have an impact at the nationallevel. Because the Constitutionexpressly grantsto
Congress the power to regulate substantive patent law, the local patent-reform
movement is limited to the development and utilization of local proceduralrules to
streamlinepatentlitigation infederaldistrict courts. This Article examines the success
of the local patent-reform movement initiatedby localjudges and bar associations
sweeping different regions of the United States and suggests that bottom-up reform
must be encouraged to solve the nationalproblem of the broken patent system.
INTRODUCTION
The current patent system is in trouble. Patents issued on questionable inventions
such as "method of exercising a cat" with a flashing laser pointer for cats to chase,'
"method of swinging on a swing,",2 lidded containers,3 and crustless peanut butter and

t Copyright © 2010 Xuan-Thao Nguyen.
* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; former intellectual property Associate,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP (NYC) and Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn
(NYC). A version of this Article was presented at the ABA's Annual Intellectual Property
Conference in Washington, D.C. This Article was partially funded by the Michael C. and
Jacqueline M. Barrett Endowed Faculty Research Fund. Special thanks to Erik Darwin Hille and
Khai-LeifNguyen-Hille for their love, patience, and support.
1. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 3, 1993).
2. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000). For a list of "crazy patents" see Free

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:449

jelly sandwiches4 have raised questions about patent quality. 5 The patent-quality
problem leads to exorbitant litigation costs. It is estimated that patent-litigation costs
have soared to an average combined amount of almost $8 million for both parties in
complex cases, 6 prompting scores ofnegative reactions and strong demands for patentlitigation reform. Commentators have noted that generalist judges at the district court
level lack expertise and are unequipped to handle patent cases, contributing to the
skyrocketing costs of litigation, arguably due to the high reversal rate by the Federal
Circuit.7 Many experts claim that the patent system has been broken for some time, as
various interest groups have descended on Congress to lobby for reform.8 But although
the 2008 elections were filled with many unexpected outcomes, the 110th Congress
delivered no surprises, as it once again failed to pass any legislation to overhaul the
patent system. 9

Patents Online, List of Crazy Patents, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html. See also
James Glieck, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 644, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/12/magazine/patently-absurd.html; Lawrence Lessig, The
Problem with Patents, INDusTRY STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1999, http://www.thestandard.com/
article/0, 1902,4296,00.html.
3. U.S. Patent No. 6,889,867 (filed Oct. 28, 2003).
4. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997); see also Mark Gibbs, A Patent for
Crust-Less Peanut Butter and Jelly Sandwiches? (Jan. 31, 2001), http://www.itworld.com

/NWW_1-29-01 _opinion.
5. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents,20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521,
1524 (2005); Glieck, supra note 2; Lessig, supra note 2.
6. See Sarah Lai Stirland, Will Congress Stop High-Tech Trolls?, 37 NAT'L J. 612, 612
(2005) (reporting the $8 million price tag of patent litigation for cases where damages reach $25
million).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 109-673, at 3-5 (2006); see also infra notes 213-15 and
accompanying text.
8. See William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the PatentLaws: ForgingLegislationAddressing
DisparateInterests, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 9, 14-16 (2006) (outlining and
critiquing the agendas advanced by various interest groups lobbying for patent reform); see also
Patent Trolls: Factor Fiction: OversightHearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and IntellectualPropertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 31 (2006) [hereinafter
Patent Trolls Hearing] (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel,
Time Warner) (urging Congress to reform the patent system because it is out of control);
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2 795, the PatentAct of2005: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) [hereinafter PatentAct Hearing](statement of Emery Simon,
Counsel, The Small Business Alliance) ("[Allowing patent holders to shop for pro-plaintiff
jurisdictions] undermines confidence in the fairness of adjudicated outcomes. It has proven very
burdensome for technology companies sued in jurisdictions far removed from their principal
places of business where the bulk of the evidence or witnesses are to be found.").
9. Ben Butkus, Patent Reform Bill Stalls in Senate as Foes Object to Damages
Apportionment, BIOTECH TRANSFER WEEK, Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.genomeweb.com/
biotechtransferweek/patent-reform-bill-stalls-senate-foes-object-damages-apportionment.
(reporting that the Senate would not work on a patent reform bill "until at least after the
November elections"); see also John Timmer, Patent Reform Act Suffers Serious Setback,
Stalled in Senate, ARs TECHNICA, May 5,2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080505patent-reform-act-suffers-serious-setback-stalled-in-senate.html.
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Patent law is federal law, so the appropriate body to initiate and facilitate patent-law
reform is the federal government, that is, Congress and the Supreme Court. This
normative thinking has a strong foundation in the Constitution, which expressly
authorizes Congress to legislate patent law.' 0 Indeed, the First Congress enacted the
first patent statute." Naturally, patent reformers focus their efforts on persuading
Congress to amend the troubled patent system. Powerful corporations and interest
groups aggressively and persistently lobby Congress to influence revisions to the patent
system.12 In recent years, lobbying efforts have intensified, and many eyes have turned
toward Congress for a complete revision of the patent system. As bills for a major
overhaul languish in Congress, others look3 to the Supreme Court for patent reform and
subsequently also encounter limitations.'
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom of patent reform that looks
primarily to the top-Congress and the Supreme Court-for changes. Within the
theoretical framework of dynamic federalism,' 4 patent reform can involve an overlap of
both the national and local levels ofthe federal government.1 5 Patent reform can occur
at the local level and serve both local and national interests. Patent reform at the local
level is dynamic as locales can serve as laboratories for changes, vertically compete
with the national government,6and become influential catalysts for changes that have
impacts at the national level.1
This Article critiques the top-down, national-only approach to patent reform that has
neglected powerful bottom-up efforts by local judges and members of local bar
associations throughout many regions of the United States. Far from the halls of
Congress and the gavel of the United States Supreme Court, local judges and bar
associations collaborate to streamline the patent litigation process and shape litigants'

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS

OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW

143-44

(1967) (discussing the beginning of national patent law and the passage of the first national
patent statute-the Patent Act of 1790).
12. See generally Patent Trolls Hearing,supra note 8; PatentAct Hearing,supra note 8.
13. See infra Part ll.
14. See generally David E. Adelman &Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:The Case
Against Reallocating EnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1807-08

(2008) (explaining dynamic federalism as a recent scholarly trend in which academics embrace
and advocate for dynamic interactions between the state and federal governments); Renee M.
Jones, Dynamic Federalism:Competition, CooperationandSecurities Enforcement, 11 CONN.
INS. L.J. 107, 109 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of competition between state and federal

governments in shaping corporate regulatory policies); Robert A. Schapiro, Towarda Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REv. 243, 248-50 (2005) (advocating a new theory of
federalism that recognizes the overlapping, interactive, and competing interests of federal and
state governments).
15. See generally Adelman & Engel, supra note 14, at 1796-97 (identifying environmental
federalism in recent years as dynamic); Schapiro, supranote 14.
16. This Article utilizes principles of dynamic federalism, but it does not argue for patent
reform through state or local governments. The terms "national" and "local" are used to describe
the distinction between different segments of the federal government: "National" refers to
Congress and the Supreme Court and embodies the "top-down" approach to patent-law reform.
"Local" refers mainly to federal district courts and patent bar associations that practice in those
district courts and embodies the "bottom-up" approach to patent-law reform.
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conduct. They transform their districts into centers of patent expertise, with judges
having a keen knowledge of patent law and the daily operation and management of
complex patent litigation. These centers of patent expertise adjudicate cases within a
short time frame, increase access to justice, and deliver swift results. They reduce the
fear of patent complexity and encourage judges and j uries to participate in the process.
In nine years, the local patent reform movement has spread to federal courts in
California, Delaware, Georgia, Texas, Minnesota, Washington, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Ohio, North Carolina, Missouri, Massachusetts, Illinois, and New York.' 7 Local
reform is in the spirit of dynamic federalism where both local and national interests are
served. i
To be clear, this Article does not advocate against reform activities in Congress and
the Supreme Court. That approach would be within the mode of static dual federalism,
which this Article does not embrace.' 9 Instead, this Article argues that in some
instances, patent law reform can occur interactively at both levels, national and local.
The local patent-reform process identified in this Article serves as a valuable reminder
that changes related to an area of strictly federal law, such as patent law, can be
accomplished locally and yield important results that benefit the entire nation. Local
patent reform does not change substantive patent law, allaying fears of violating the
supremacy of national patent law. Instead, local patent reform focuses on the
development and utilization of local procedural rules to streamline patent litigation.2 °
Several districts have already undertaken these reform efforts and experienced
significant benefit, 21which suggests that such efforts should be encouraged, in light of
the impasse on patent reform at the top over the last few years.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the current state of the patent
system and factors contributing to claims of a "broken" patent system. Part II
advocates a departure from the normative static thinking of patent-law reform. It is
time to embrace a spirit of dynamic federalism by acknowledging and encouraging
innovative reform at the local level, thereby solving, in part, a national problem. Part
III identifies and explains the top-down approaches to patent reform that epitomize
conventional thinking about repairing the broken patent system. The Supreme Court
has ventured into patent reform by accepting and deciding an unprecedented number of
patent cases over the last few years. The Court's limited experience and exposure to
the complexity of the patent system prevents needed meaningful reform for the patent

17. See infra notes 176-91.
18. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (explaining the concept of federalism
which represents "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State
and National Governments"); see also Jones, supra note 14, at 109 (discussing the role of
federalism in corporate regulation and emphasizing the importance of competition and
interaction among federal and state government regulators to establish an appropriate allocation
of regulatory authority that would reflect the public opinion). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky,
EmpoweringStates When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption,69 BROOK. L. REv.
1313, 1329 (2004).
19. See generally Adelman & Engel, supra note 14, at 1807-08 (critiquing the static
dualism advanced by other scholars and embracing dynamic federalism); Schapiro, supranote
14, at 248 (critiquing the static nature of dual federalism).
20. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
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system. Congress has embarked on patent-law reform by proposing comprehensive
legislation that positions interest groups against each other and therefore stalls one
proposal after another.
Part IV identifies the local patent reform movement sweeping through numerous
regions of the United States. Local federal judges and bar associations together create
and implement systemic procedures to curb abuses in patent litigation, reduce costs
associated with patent litigation, shorten litigation time, increase access to justice, and
enhance local district and judicial expertise in handling patent cases. Their reform
efforts provide benefits beyond their localities, solving part of the gridlock in
Congress.
Instead of encouraging the local patent-reform movement, Congress has willfully
attempted to punish the local, bottom-up reformers. Part V highlights recently
proposed legislation that attempts to punish, though not on its face, a maverick district
known for its local reform--the Eastern District of Texas-for its adoption of the
Local Patent Rule and the transformation of the district into a national judicial center
of patent expertise. The proposed patent-reform legislation is an example of the
politicization of patent reform at the national level that ignores the important
contributions ofjudges and bar associations at the local level.
I. THE "BROKEN" PATENT SYSTEM

It is difficult to ignore patents today. National and local media draw readers'
attention to problems with the patent system. 22 These media outlets have concluded
24
23
that the system is "broken" and that there is an overall failure of the patent system.
Headlines on patent-related topics are common. Examples include: the high costs of
27
2526
patented drugs,25 genetic
engineering, cloning cows and sheep, patenting of tax28
planning methods, migration of patents to tax shelters overseas, 29 and plans in

22. See, e.g., Jeff St. Onge, Jury Verdict Overturned in Microsoft Patent Case, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2007, at D02 (reporting that the district court in San Diego overturned a $1.52
billion jury verdict and ordered a new trial on the damages). See generally World Officials
Debate

Breaking

Tamilu

Patent,

USATODAY.COM,

Oct.

25,

2005,

http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-10-25-bird-flu _x.htm (summarizing the debate by
health ministers from different countries on responses to the bird-flu pandemic and the
possibilities of poor nations defying patent protection for the drug Tamiflu).
23. See, e.g., Editorial, Pay to Obey, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at A24.
24.

See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,

BUREAUCRATS, AND LAwYERs PUT INNOvATION AT RISK (2008).

25. See Marlene Cimons, Drug Costs Threaten Patent Protection, NATURE MED., Jan.
2003, at 9, available at http://www.nature.com/nm/joumal/v9/nl/full/nm0l03-9b.html
(reporting on proposals to ease regulations on generic production of brand-name drugs).
26. See Edmund L. Andrews, Long Delay Seen in Patentsfor Genetic Engineering,N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 19, 1990, at Dl (reporting that companies must wait an average of four years to
obtain genetic-engineering patents).
27. Infingen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wisc. 1999);
Yvonne Cripps, The Art and Science of GeneticModification: Re-EngineeringPatentLaw and
ConstitutionalOrthodoxies, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Winter 2004, at 1, 9 (discussing
the patents granted on cloning Dolly the sheep and other nonhuman mammalian animals).
28. See Floyd Norris, PatentLaw is Getting Tax Crazy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 20, 2006,
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Congress to make payments to rescue the banking industry from patent infringement
liability. 30 These headlines dominate print and electronic media. Since anything under
the sun created by a human is potentially patentable, 1 patents proliferate even amid the
rise of strong criticism of the "broken" patent system.
The number of patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
reflects the nation's frenzy over patents. For instance, in the ten-year period between
1997 and 2007, the number of patents issued increased by 47%, from 124,069 issued in
1997 to 182,899 in 2007.32 The patent application numbers are even higher because
not all patent applications satisfy the statutory requirements of patentability and are
either rejected or abandoned. During the same ten-year period, patent applications rose
from 232,424 in 1997
to 484,955 in 2007, demonstrating an increase of more than one
33
hundred percent.
The large number of patent applications and patents issued means more disputes
and litigation. 34 In 1997, there were 2112 patent cases filed in district courts across the
United States; 35 ten years later, the number climbed to 2896 patent cases. 36 Patent
37
litigation is expensive; on the average, the cost per suit is approximately $1.5 million.

available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/19/business/norris20.php (reporting on the
controversial issue of patenting tax-saving strategies). See generally Dan L. Burk & Brett H.
McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm, 26 VA. TAX REV. 981 (2006) (observing the
tax community's anxiety over the patenting of tax-saving strategies); William A. Drennan, The
PatentedLoophole: How Should CongressRespond to this JudicialInvention?, 59 FLA. L. REV.
229 (2007) (asserting that Congress should not allow patents on tax strategies that exploit more
tax loopholes because the loopholes will neither stimulate economic growth nor enhance life
quality for Americans).
29. Glenn R. Simpson, A New Twist in Tax Avoidance: Firms Send Best Ideas Abroad,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al (reporting the practice of many technology companies of
sending patents to holding companies in countries like Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland,
and Singapore to avoid paying U.S. taxes).
30. See Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, Lawmakers Move to GrantBanks Immunity Against Patent
Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A22 (reporting that Senator Jeff Sessions has sponsored
legislation that would grant banks immunity against pending patent-infringement suits
"potentially saving them billions of dollars").
31. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
32. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 19632008, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm.
33. Id.
34. See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet,and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 141 (2005)
[hereinafter Patent Quality Improvement Hearing] (statement of Nathan P. Myhrvold, Chief
Executive Officer, Intellectual Ventures) ("[T]he growth of patent lawsuits reflects the growth of
the use of patents, and the growth of technologically innovative companies that rely on
patents.").
35. ADMIN. OmCE or THE U.S. COURTS, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. C-2
(1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialbusiness/c02sep97.pdf.
36. U.S. District Courts-Intellectual Property Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending
During the 12-Month Period Ending Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/
appendices/Cl 1Sep07.pdf.
37. Mark H. Webbink, A New Paradigmfor Intellectual PropertyRights in Software, 2005
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0012, 15 (2005).
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million for each party in cases
The cost can reach the astonishingly high figure of3$4
8
where damages exceed approximately $25 million.
Patent litigation generally is complex and factually intensive. In an infringement
case, lawyers must master the patented invention, the technology related to the
invention, and the prior art.39 In most infringement cases, the lawyers need experts in
the relevant fields to explain the technology at issue to them, and subsequently to the
judges and jurors. 4° The litigants expend substantial time and resources preparing
claim charts and disclosures of preliminary infringement and invalidity contentions, as
well as attending claim-construction hearings. 41 All litigation steps are factually
intensive and generally exorbitantly expensive.
The role of patents today, according to major studies, differs depending on the
industry.42 Regardless of the differences, outcries about exorbitant patent-litigation
costs echo from the media to congressional hearings.43 From technology companies to

38. See Stirland, supranote 6, at 613 (reporting that complex patent litigation can cost both
parties as much as a combined $8 million).
39. See MICHAEL D. KAMINSKI, EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF U.S. PATENT LITIGATION,
available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31 Publications/FileUpload 137/2941/Effective

Management of US Patent Litigation.pdf (stating that patent litigation is costly because patent
cases often involve complex technology and providing an example of the factually intensive
preparation required at the prelitigation stage: lawyers in prelitigation must review the patents at
issue, the prosecution history, and relevant prior art to evaluate the validity of the patents).
40. See generally Cynthia E. Kernick, The Trial, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGY
HANDBOOK 767 (Barry L. Grossman & Garry Hoffman eds., 2d. ed. 2005), available at
http://www.reedsmith.com/ db/_documents/PLI2_Chap_21.pdf(discussing pretrial preparation
in patent cases).
41. See generally Patrick H. Higgins & Mary Sue Henifin, Build, Maintain, andEnforce
Strategic Market Exclusivity, in PATENT ENFORCEMENT BEST PRACTICES 5, 20-21 (Eddie
Fournier ed., 2007), available at http://bipc.com/media/pnc/5/media.1625.pdf (detailing
preparation for Markman hearings in patent cases).
42. See,FTC/DOJ Joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law (Feb. 6,

2002) (testimony of Richard C. Levin, President, Yale University), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/levinrichardc.htm (summarizing the
findings of major studies on patents). President Levin remarked:
The most striking and most influential finding from the data collected in the mid1980s was that the role of patents differed across industries and technologies. In
most industries, firms reported that being first to market with a new or improved

product and supporting their head start with superior marketing and customer
service most effectively protected the competitive advantages of their R&D. In
these industries, patents were not regarded as highly effective in protecting a
firm's competitive advantage. The pharmaceutical and certain other chemical
industries were striking exceptions. In these industries, patent protection was
deemed to be far and away the most effective means of appropriating the returns
from research and development. Despite significant changes in patent law during
the ensuing years, a follow-up survey conducted in the late 1990s by Wesley
Cohen, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh essentially replicated our findings.
Id.
43. See Perspectives on Patents: Post-GrantReview Proceduresand Other Litigation
Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and
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banking and insurance brokerage firms, many voice their complaints about bad
patents"4 and attacks staged by "patent trolls," which are patent holding companies
whose primary reason for existence is to capitalize on their patent property via patentinfringement litigation.45 Large corporations spend significant sums of money to
defend themselves in patent-infringement cases. For example, Intel spends
approximately $20 million annually on patent litigation, 46 and Microsoft spends $100
million annually.47 Over the years, the belief that patent litigation is out of control has
gained significant traction.48 Indeed, different interest groups have joined forces and
49
formed coalitions to lobby Congress to reform the law relating to patent litigation.
II. LOCAL PATENT REFORM AND DYNAMIC FEDERALISM

In the area of patent law, Congress has sole authority to legislate.5 0 During the very
first session of Congress, the patent statute was enacted.5' Congress subsequently

General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (asserting that the "patent litigation system is broken"); Patent
Quality Improvement Hearing, supra note 34, at 141 (testimony of Nathan P. Myhrvold)

(representing the small technology companies' view and stating that "[i]itigation saps resources
that small inventors could put toward more productive pursuits, like new inventions. Reducing
the likelihood of litigation, with the attendant cost, complexity and uncertainty is a worthy
goal").
44. See Gary L. Rebak, PatentlyAbsurd.: Too Many PatentsAre Just as Badfor Society as
Too Few, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 45-46 (recounting IBM's strong tactics of using bad

patents to coerce companies into settling a lawsuit). Mr. Rebak recalled that the lead counsel for
IBM threatened him that "maybe you don't infringe these seven patents. But we have 10,000
U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and
find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay us $20
million?" Id.; see also PatentQuality Improvement: Hearingof the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. 15-19 (2003)

(statement of Mark Kesslen, Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co.) (representing banks and insurance brokerage firms and reporting the rise in
frivolous lawsuits against the banking and insurance industries based on bad patents).
45. For an example of the extent to which "patent trolls" can burden businesses, especially
those in the technology sector, see PatentReform: The FutureofAmerican Innovation: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 250 (2007) (statement of Mary E. Doyle,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Palm, Inc.) (stating that out of the sixteen lawsuits
pending against Palm, thirteen were brought by patent-holding or licensing companies).
46. Stirland, supra note 6, at 613.
47. Dawn Kawamoto, Microsoft: Patent Overhaul Needed Now, CNET NEWS, Mar. 5,
2005, http://www.news.com/2100-1014-5611047.html.
48. See PatentTrolls Hearing,supranote 8, at 26 (testimony of Chuck Fish) (testifying that
patent litigation is out of control and needs urgent reforms); see alsoPatentAct Hearing,supra
note 8, at 7 (testimony of Emery Simon) (claiming that the escalated level of patent litigation
and forum shopping by plaintiffs "undermines confidence in the fairness of adjudicated
outcomes").
49. See generallyPatent Trolls Hearing,supranote 8 (testimony of Chuck Fish) (lobbying
for patent litigation reforms on behalf of Time Warner); Patent Act Hearing,supra note 8
(testimony of Emery Simon) (lobbying for patent litigation reforms on behalf of the computer
and software industry).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power... Topromote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
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amended the statute to develop a body of law relevant to changes in technology and the
economy. 52 Everyone looks to Congress for patent-law reform. 53 All the normative
reform efforts are continually displayed within the halls of Congress and are confined
largely within the Beltway. 54 Lobbyists and interest groups exert influence in shaping
patent reform.55 All efforts seem to ignore an ongoing movement at the local level,
away from the national epicenter of action, to reform how patent litigation should be
changed to reflect both national and local interests in patent cases. 56 Given the
languishing pace of patent-law reform in Congress and the unpredictability of the
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
51. See Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Freedom to Experiment: Toward a Concept of Inventor
Welfare, 90 J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 245, 245 (2008) ("The First Federal Congress

exercised its constitutional power to 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' by
passing the Patent and Copyright Acts of 1790." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
52. See Qin Shi, Reexamination, Opposition,or Litigation? Legislative Efforts to Create a
Post-GrantPatent Quality ControlSystem, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433,436-38 (2003) (explaining the
congressional legislative reform from 1980 to 1999 related to a post-grant patent control
system); see also Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, The "First-to-File"Patent System: Why Adoption is
not an Option!, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 10 (2007), http://law.richmond.edu/ jolt/vl4il/
article3.pdf ("The drive for global patent harmonization is gaining momentum as Congress
continues to amend American patent laws to conform to international treaties and standards.").
53. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritorialityin U.S. PatentLaw, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 2119, 2127 (2008) (looking to Congress to close loopholes relating to the
extraterritoriality problem); John W. Schlicher, PatentLicensing. What to do After Medimmune
v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 364, 392 (2007) ("Patent owners should
also consider asking Congress to amend sections 294(c) and (d) of the Patent Act to make clear
that an arbitration award will have no effect on the patent owner's rights as to any other person,
and remove concern that an invalidity decision might have adverse effects in later actions

involving others."); Herman Levy, Newsfrom the Committees, PROCUREMENT LAWYER, (ABA
Section of Pub. Contract Law, Chi., Ill.), Winter 2008, at 19, 19-20 (reporting concern about
patent infringement and desire for Congress to amend patent legislation to protect the
government contractors expressed during the September 2007 meeting of ABA's Research and
Development and Intellectual Property Committee).
54. See, e.g., Anne Broache, House OKs Revamp ofPatentSystem, CNET NEWS, Sept. 7,
2007, http://news.cnet.com/House-OKs-revamp-of-patent-system/2100-1014_3-6206816.html
(reporting an example of Congressional patent reform); Timothy B. Lee, Analysis: Patent
Reform Bill Unable to Clean Up Patent Mess, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 25, 2008,
http://arstechnica.com/articles/culture/clean-up-patent-mess.ars (stating that the fighting among
various interest groups over patent reform did not yield results in 2007 "on the Hill" and that the
groups should look to the Supreme Court for reform efforts).
55. Groups such as Coalition for Patent Fairness, "14 labor unions, including the United
Steelworkers, the Patent Office Professional Association and the Communications Workers of
America," Computing Technology Industry Association, and large technology vendors such as
Microsoft, IBM, and Symantec have expressed their various views about patent-law reform.
Grant Gross, Tech Groups Push Patent Reform, PCWoRLD, Feb. 9, 2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/142320-1/techjgroupspushpatent reform.hnl; see also Liza
Porteus Viana, US Patent Reform Legislation on Bumpy Road to Completion, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Feb. 6, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=912 (reporting the
lobbying efforts of interest groups on patent law reform).
56. See Patent Act Hearing, supra note 8 (highlighting a patent system riddled with
problems); Viana, supra note 55 (reporting the issues supported and opposed by various interest
groups).
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Supreme Court, the local patent-law-reform movement was ripe. 7 Furthermore, local
patent reform is an example of how bottom-up reforms parallel the current trends in
dynamic federalism.
Constitutional law scholars have fueled much of the debate in the last two decades
on federalism, examining and positing the constitutional limits of congressional
authority, state and federal government relationships, and the social benefits and costs
of federalism.58 While the debate is ongoing among scholars in constitutional law,
scholars in other areas such as environmental law,5 9 corporate securities, 60 and
immigration 6 1 have turned their attention to the implications of federalism for their
respective fields.
In recent years, scholars have embraced a new trend of federalism, proclaiming that
strict "[d]ual federalism is dead" and that neither federal nor state governing authority
can be seen through a single, nonoverlapping lens.62 The new alternative to the static
dual federalism is dynamic federalism, which has many other names such as
"federalism" or "interactive federalism., 63 Under the new concept of federalism,
scholars focus on the dynamic interaction among the states and the federal government;
and the federal
the competition, either confrontational or cooperative, between 6states
4
government; and the overlapping of state and federal authority.
The local movement, as described in this Article, drawing an analogy to dynamic
federalism, challenges the normative, static thinking that anything related to patents

57. See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 44, 47
(discussing the patent reform efforts in Congress and noting that "[flor the past three years in a
row, patent reform bills have languished in Congress").
58. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, THEDEVELOPMENT OFAMERICAN FEDERALISM (1987);
A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to
Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REv. 789, 793 (1985); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's
Affection: Federalism'sForgottenMarketplace,56 VAND.L. REv. 329 (2003).
59. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 157 (2005); William W. Buzbee, Brownfields,
EnvironmentalFederalism,andInstitutionalDeterminism,21 WM. & MARY ENVTL.L. & POL'Y
REv. 1, 44-46 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism, 95 MICH. L.
REv. 570, 587 (1996).
60. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon
Delaware,83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Robert J. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, SecuritiesFraudas
CorporateGovernance:Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REv. 859 (2003); Ralph K_
Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL
STUD.251 (1977).
61. See generally Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism,61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008).
62. Schapiro, supra note 14, at 243.
63. Adelman & Engel, supra note 14, at 1807-08 (noting "a new trend in federalism
scholarship is emerging that is alternatively referred to as 'empowerment federalism,'
'polyphonic federalism,' 'interactive federalism,' 'dynamic federalism,' and even 'vertical
regulatory competition and can be applied in such areas as environmental and corporate law).
Adelman and Engel also advocate an "adaptive federalism" as a variant of dynamic federalism.
Id.at 1827-31.
64. See Schapiro, supra note 14, at 278-301 (tracing the different theories of federalism in
an attempt to move beyond dualist federalism).
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must be left to Congress. 65 Little progress has been made, as the top-down reformers
have so far raced to the top. Congress and the Supreme Court have thus far failed to
solve the broken-patent problem. The local movement provides a bottom-up solution
that interacts, competes, and overlaps with the top-down approach to solve parts of the
broken and complex patent system. The local movement is a product of work
accomplished within local laboratories in many different locales across the nation to
reform patent litigation. 66 The local movement demonstrates that not all patent-related
issues should be at the mercy of congressional attention,6 7languishing for years on
legislation pulled and pushed by powerful interest groups.
The local movement embodies the spirit of cooperative reform in that it represents a
68
system sensitive to the legitimate interests at both the local and national levels.
Congress wanted to address problems associated with patent litigation but failed to do
so during the past couple of terms. Local judges and bar associations compete with
Congress by partially filling the void. The local movement reveals how local judges
and bar association members, together with citizens in a locality, can bring positive
results to solve problems in the patent area by delivering fair and speedy resolutions to
patent disputes, reducing patent litigation costs, shortening the timetables for
infringement and defense contentions, imposing "good cause" standards to justify
delays in pleadings, and dismissing patent cases with prejudice if certain deadlines are
missed. 69 Consequently, as more patent cases are promptly disposed of and new cases
are filed in the reformed districts, local federal judges have opportunities to enhance
in patent law and subsequently create new federal judicial centers for
their expertise
7
patent cases. 0
The work accomplished by the local movement does not suggest that all patentrelated reform should be conducted at the local level. The strict dual federalism view of
either national or local authority is not always productive to patent reform. Moreover,
the view that all patent-related reform should be local would be unconstitutional, as
Congress has the constitutional mandate to legislate substantivepatent law. 71 The local
movement, however, demonstrates how changes related to an area of law-patent law

65. See, e.g., Holbrook, supranote 53, at 2127 (looking to Congress for patent law reform);
Levy, supranote 53, at 20 (reporting procurement practitioners look to Congress for patent law
reform); Schlicher, supranote 53, at 392 (noting patent owners look to Congress for patent law
reform); Viana, supranote 55 (reporting that big companies and influential groups fight inside
the beltway for their version of patent law reform).
66. See infra Part IV.
67. See infra Part IV.
68. See Schapiro, supra note 14, at 278-301 (denouncing dual federalism and advancing a
new theory of dynamic federalism); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
(explaining the concept of federalism). The Supreme Court has long noted that federalism
represents "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments." Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
69. See infra Part IV.
70. See infra Part IV.
71. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,231 (1964) ("[A] State could not,
consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond
its expiration date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for
federal patents" because the State doing so would undermine "the policy of Congress of
granting patents only to true inventions, and then only for a limited time.").
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specifically, which has often been deemed to be exclusively within the power of
Congress--can be achieved procedurally, for example, through the creation and
adoption of local patent rules at the district level.72
The local movement does not reform the substantive patent law because Congress
still possesses the sole power to legislate. Undoubtedly, the Patent and Copyright
Clause in the Constitution speaks for the national interest in having a national patentlaw system and vests Congress with the power and authority to govern the patent
system. The local patent-reform movement's development and utilization of local
patent rules does not encroach upon Congress's authority or flaunt the supremacy of
substantive patent law. The local patent rules are not substantive patent law; they are
procedures unique to patent cases that govern how patent cases should be managed and
disposed of at the district court level. The end result is an increased access to justice, a
reduction in the time to dispose of cases, a decrease in litigation costs, a creation of
patent expert centers throughout the nation, and a restoration of certainty that benefits
the nation as a whole.
III. RACE TO THE TOP FOR PATENT REFORM
A. The Supreme Court and PatentReform
After a long period of relative silence, the Supreme Court has robustly injected
itself into reforming patent law. 73 Over the last few terms, the Court has heard a
significant number of patent cases, especially in light of the fact that the number of
cases heard annually by the Court has sharply decreased over the years. 74 The Court's
new interest in patents may fundamentally change patent law, an area of law that many
considered settled after Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 75 which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent appeals. 76 The

72. See infra Part IV.
73. See John F. Dufly, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar

of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 273, 283 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court has become
"increasingly interested in directing the development of law in the field," as evidenced by the
2001 term). Prior to the 2001 term, the Court heard barely one patent case per term. See Tun-Jen
Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 39, 50 n.50
(2008) (listing the patent-related cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1982 to 2000). The
cases decided during the 2001 term were Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (doctrine of equivalents); Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation
System, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (the scope of Federal Circuit's exclusivejurisdiction in patent
cases); J.E.M Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001)
(patentability of plants).
74. See Kevin W. Kirsch & David A. Mancino, Wind of Change in U.S. Patent Law,
INTELL. PROP. & TEcIl. L.J., Oct. 2007, at 1, 1 (noting that in the last quarter century, the
Supreme Court heard only sixteen patent cases as compared to the six cases in the past two

terms).
75. See generally Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S.
Court ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit(1887-1982), 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (2001) (tracing
the genesis of the Federal Circuit, the federal appellate court with exclusive jurisdiction over

patent appeals).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (providing that the Federal Circuit has exclusive
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Supreme Court has drastically altered the course ofpatent jurisprudence and, according
to some commentators, undermined the Federal Circuit's authority in charting the
contours of patent law, 7 as seen by a string of reversals of important Federal Circuit
decisions.
Leading the pack of reversals is eBay v. MercExchange.78 The Supreme Court
decided to eliminate the long-standing rule propounded by the Federal Circuit granting
79
automatic permanent injunctions to prevailing patent holders in infringement suits.
The decision, according to some critics, also overturned the Supreme Court's own
precedent on automatic permanent injunctions in patent cases.80 The decision forces the
patent holder to meet a difficult four-factor test before an injunction is issued. The
plaintiff must show: (1) an irreparable injury; (2) that a remedy at law would be
inadequate; (3) that a balancing of the party's interests warrants an equitable remedy;
and (4) that an injunction is not against the public interest.8' The decision weakens the
power of patent holders, by making it harder to exert the threat of permanent injunction
over defendants in infringement suits. 2 Consequently, defendants, faced with the
jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases decided in the U.S. District Courts under 28 U.S.C. §
1338 (2006)); see Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: CriticalReflections on Draftinga Substantive PatentLaw Treaty,57 DUKE L.J. 85,
121 n. 162 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court considered seven patent cases between the

summer of 2005 and the summer of 2007). The Supreme Court cases decided in the two-year
period between 2005 and 2007 were: KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&TCorp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedInmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); LaboratoryCorp. ofAmerica Holdings v. MetaboliteLaboratories,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted);
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); and MerckKGaA v. IntegraLifesciencesI,Ltd., 545
U.S. 193 (2005).
77. The Supreme Court's criticism of the Federal Circuit has led, in part, to the debate over
whether patent cases should be decided on appeal only by the Federal Circuit. See generally
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, RethinkingPatentLaw's Uniformity Principle,101 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1619 (2007); S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, RethinkingPatentLaw's Uniformity
Principle:A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1735 (2007).
78. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also David L. McCombs, Phillip B. Philbin & Jacob G.
Hodges, Intellectual PropertyLaw, 60 SMU L. REv. 1141, 1145-46 (2007) (analyzing eBay
and observing that the impact of the decision has been "far-ranging, affecting various aspects of
patent litigation, including trials, decisions on settlement, ongoing licenses, and the practices of
competitors, patent holders, and patent holding companies").
79. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that the Federal Circuit "erred in its categorical
grant" of injunctive relief).
80. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in JudicialActivism in
Interpretingthe PatentLaw in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 165, 187-88 (2007) (stating that the Supreme Court held almost a century ago, in
ContinentalPaperBag Co. v. EasternPaperBag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1907), that a patentee is
generally entitled to permanent injunctive relief to prevent ongoing patent infringement and that
the recent eBay v. MercExchangecase both repudiated without justification and undermined the
important precedent without explanation).
81. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (outlining the well-established test for injunctive relief adopted in
other areas of law and dictating that no departure from the test is warranted in patent law).
82. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 72 (2007) (stating that eBay v. MercExchangeis an example of
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reduced likelihood83of a permanent injunction, have little incentive to settle patent
infringement suits.
Next, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,84 the Court rejected the Federal

Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit" test in declaratory judgment
actions. In that case, MedImmune licensed a patent from Genentech for a certain
respiratory drug, and while it was still paying the royalties on the licensed patent, it
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the patent.85 Under the
Federal Circuit's established rule in patent cases, the presence of a valid license meant
that no case or controversy between the parties existed, and thus the licensee had no
Article III standing to bring suit. 86 In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that the licensee had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action, concluding
that "promising to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not
amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity."87 The Court mandated
that the focus for declaratory judgment actions for patent cases must center on the
"actual controversy" test, which requires that a dispute be "definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. 88 The mandate
means that whether a party has standing to bring a declaratory
judgment action is
89
analyzed under all the facts and circumstances of the action.

weakening patent power).
83. See Raymond Millien, The Evolving lP Marketplace,in PRACTISING LAw INST., PATENT
LAw INsTITUTE 2007: THE IMPACT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON YOUR PRACTICE 335,344 (PLI
Intellectual Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-899, 2007) (asserting that eBay has caused a
shift in negotiation leverage from patent holders to potential defendants because alleged
infiingers no longer face the automatic injunction of their infringing activities, thus, "the
likelihood that they would be willing to settle most certainly decreases"); Raymond T. Nimmer,
Developments in PatentLicensing, in 2 PRACTISING LAW INST., 2NDANNUAL PATENT INSTITUTE
317, 322 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-923, 2008) ("[After eBay,] an
accused [patent infringer] with large resources may have more incentive to test the patent in
court. The alleged infringer may have less reason to fear having its product line shut down or
recalled.").
84. 549 U.S. 118, 132 n. 11 (2007) (quoting Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., v. Pfizer, Inc., 395
F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
85. Id. at 121-22.
86. The district court in Medlmmune followed the Federal Circuit's established rule,
explained in Gen-ProbeInc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and dismissed
the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 122. Relying on precedent, the
Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958,962-

63 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
87. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 135.

88. See id at 127; see also Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried
& Todd R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit'sPatent Law Decisions in 2006: A New
Chapterin the OngoingDialoguewith the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 793, 815 (2007)

(urging that in light of Medlmmune, attention should now be given to "old (pre-Federal Circuit)
Supreme Court authority, and not just that in the patent area"); S. Jay Plager, The Price of
Popularity: The Court ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit2007, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 751, 756
(2007) (stating that Medlmmune is another decision where "the Supreme Court stepped in to
bring the Circuit's law into line with mainstream doctrine").
89. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127.
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Medlmmune is seen as another case signaling the beginning of a showdown in the
patent-reform battle. 90 The decision favors a weaker patent-protection system, as it
extends a new right to licensees-the postgrant review of the validity and
enforceability of the licensed patents. 91 Medlmmune broadens the ability of licensees
and competitors to seek declaratory judgment actions against the patent holder.92 The
licensees can continue the license relationship, enjoying the benefits of the licensed
patent, and yet have standing to bring a lawsuit to declare that the licensed patent is
invalid and not enforceable. 93 Consequently, the licensing business model, which is the
main path of moving innovation to the marketplace, is undermined as most patents in
licensing arrangements are now exposed to potential declaratory judgment actions,
which gives the licensees an opportunity to use the patents for free. 94
The Supreme Court continued its trajectory in reforming patent law by addressing
invalidity by obviousness in KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex, Inc.95 and rejected the

90. See Erik Belt & Keith Toms, The PriceofAdmission: Licensee Challenges to Patents

After MedImmune v. Genentech, BOSTON Bus. J., May-June 2007, at 12 (2007) (observing the
effects of MedImmune on patent holders and licensees and the broader context of the debate on
patent policy change).
91. See Lawrence M. Sung, License to Sue? The Availability of DeclaratoryJudgment
Actions to PatentLicensees After MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., INTELL. PROP. TODAY,

Jan. 2007, at 8, 9, available at http://www.iptoday.com/pdf/2007/l/Sung-Jan2007.pdf
(critiquing the MedImmune decision for "creat[ing] a federal court mechanism for what
essentially amounts to a post-grant opposition to an issued patent by a competitor with the
benefit of access to the patented technology but without the fear of reprisal for challenging the
patent").
92. See Kirsch & Mancino, supra note 74, at 2; McCombs et al., supra note 78, at 1149
(declaring that Medlmmune was a "Mutiny on the License"). Professor Nimmer observed how
MedImmune drastically altered the licensor and licensee relationship:
Now it appears that a case or controversy may exist even when a patent holder puts
another party on notice of a patent and identifies a product or activity of the other
party that is affected by the patent, even if the patent holder is clearly offering a
license to the other party and not threatening patent litigation. Prior to this
decision, there was a perceived safe harbor for patent holders to avoid declaratory
judgment actions resulting from their notice letters by offering in the notice letter a
license to the patent and by not threatening litigation.
Nimmer, supra note 83, at 324.
93. See Kirsch & Mancino, supra note 74, at 2.
94. See Belt & Toms, supra note 90, at 11. Supporters of a strong patent system see
Medlmmune as placing too much burden on owners of valid patents who are the licensors in
patent licensing arrangements:
Patent licensing is a major contributor to the U.S. economy: it is the primary way
that major sources of innovation, such as universities, research and development
companies, and independent inventors, bring their new technologies to market.
Allowing licensees, who are often large manufacturers, to force a "renegotiation"
of their licenses by threatening, without consequence, costly litigation to challenge
the licensed patents would bury these sources of innovation in frivolous lawsuits.
John Holden, "Patent Trolls" and PatentRemedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2134 n.77 (2007)
(noting that post-Medlmmune, a licensing agreement may not protect a patent from licensee's
challenges).
95. 550 U.S. 398,407 (2007).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:449

Federal Circuit's longstanding "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" (TSM) test as too
rigid and narrow. The Federal Circuit's pro-patent-holder approach stated that a patent
claim was not obvious unless there existed some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the various prior art references to reach the claimed invention. 96 KSR alters
the course of the patent tide by embracing an "expansive and flexible approach" in
determining whether a patent is obvious. 97 KSR lowers the threshold by allowing
common sense and creativity in the field to dictate the reasons for combining various
prior art references in evaluating obviousness. 98 By rejecting the Federal Circuit's
TSM test, the Supreme Court injected itself into reshaping patent law, although the
empirical data evaluating pre-KSR cases on obviousness failed to support such a drastic
response. 99 Under KSR, many patents, as predicted, would be easier to invalidate as
obvious in litigation. 100
By lowering the obviousness threshold, KSR will affect patentlicensing costs in ways not favorable to patent holders.' 0 ' Patent values will diminish as
licensing costs decrease, because the likelihood of invalidating a patent as obvious
02
greatly increases. 1

Continuing with its leap into reforming patent law, the Court, in Microsoft Corp.v.
AT&T Corp.,10 3 reversed the Federal Circuit's de facto extraterritorial application of
U.S. patents to activities occurring outside the United States. The Court held that
Microsoft's Windows software sent from the United States to a foreign manufacturer
on a master disk for subsequent copies, which were then installed on foreign-made
computers sold in foreign jurisdictions, did not violate section 271(f) of the Patent

96. Id.
97. Id. at 415.
98. Id. at 420.
99. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness andthe FederalCircuit:An Empirical
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 913 (2007) (conducting an
extensive study of Federal Circuit cases and concluding that "current argumentation before the
Supreme Court in KSR is that none of the assertions being made are supported by recent
empirical data").
100. See Kirsch & Mancino, supra note 74, at 4 ("It appears that the Supreme Court's
updated obviousness test will have a much greater effect on lower courts' evaluations of
obviousness challenges in patent litigation.").
101. See generally C. Paul Wazzan, The Effects of KSR v. Teleflex on Patent Licensing
Costs, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 8-13 (2007), http://www.lawtechjoumal.com/articles/2007/
04_071228_wazzan.pdf (predicting the impact of KSR on licensing cost).
102. See id. 9-13 (developing a model to demonstrate that, post KSR, the licensing value
of a patent will decrease). See generally Ann E. Mills & Patti Tereskerz, Reinvigoratingthe
Obviousness Standard:Do We Really Want What We Say We Want?, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF.Soc'Y 773, 773 (2007) (noting that the Biotechnology Information Organization believes
that the effects of KSR include: making it "easier to invalidate a patent, the value of a patent is
reduced,and ... the flow of investor capital into the industry will be reduced").
103. 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007) ("The presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent law."). AT&T
held a patent on a patent used to digitally record and process recorded speech, and Microsoft's
Windows software had the potential to infringe on that patent. Id.at 1750-51. Microsoft sold
that software to foreign computer manufacturers, which installed the software on computers sold
in foreign countries. Id.
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Act. 104 Under section 271(f),105 the exportation of components of a patented invention
from the United States for combination into an infringing product abroad can be an
infringement of a U.S. patent.' 0 6 The Court reasoned that "foreign law alone, not
United States law, currently governs the manufacture and sale of components of
patented inventions in foreign countries," and "[i]fAT&T desires to prevent copying in
foreign countries, its remedy today lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.'' 0 7
The decision is significant because there are many countries that reject software patent
protections, rendering Microsoft's infringing conduct in the United States irrelevant in
jurisdictions outside the United States.108 Consequently, the patent holder cannot obtain
damages for infringing foreign conduct.'O°
The Court's strong interest in steering the development of patents and patent law is
arguably a reflection of how patents have become vitally important, both to the
economy and society." 0 Importantly, the Court generally grants certiorari when there
are splits among the circuit courts."' However, in patent law, there are no circuit
splits." 12 The Court wields its power in an area of law where Congress has specifically

104. Id. at 1751 ("Because Microsoft does not export from the United States the copies
actually installed, it does not 'suppl[y] ...from the United States' 'components' of the relevant
computers, and therefore is not liable under § 271 (f).").
105. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006).
106. See Eric W. Guttag, When Offshore Activities Become Infringing: Applying § 271 to
Technologies that "Straddle" Territorial Borders, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, (2007),
http://law.richmond.edu/j olt/v14i /article .pdf(analyzing §271 and proposing new approaches
to transnational infringing conducts).
107. Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1759 (rejecting AT & T's advocacy for extraterritorial reach of
U.S. patent law).
108. See, e.g., James Emstmeyer, Note, Does Strict TerritorialityToll the End of Software
Patents?,89 B.U. L. Rev. 1267, 1295 (2009) ("The holding[]of Microsoft v. AT&Teffectively
eliminate[s] protection under domestic patent law for an American software inventor against
domestic competitors who export the software to overseas markets. Remedy under foreign
patent law is also problematic. The lack of protection of software patent rights across national
borders.., seriously diminishes an important commercial benefit of software patents.").
109. See Marc J. Pensabene & Thomas S. Gabriel, To Sue or Not to Sue: Risks of Unlocking
Value Through PatentLitigation, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2007, at 18, 20 (observing
that Microsoft v. AT&T "effectively eliminated [the] trend of obtaining damages for foreign
replicated software").
110. See William P. Skladony, Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics: The U.S. Supreme Court
May Considerthe Doctrineof PatentExhaustion,INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2007, at 1,4
(stating that patents "play a more significant role in modem markets and economies" than they
did before the Supreme Court's recent foray into patent law reform).
111. SuP.CT.R. 10(a).
112. Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit offered the following observation on the Supreme
Court's recent strong focus on patent law:
Perhaps more curiously, though in keeping with the notion that patent law now
plays a major economic role in the nation, the Supreme Court in several other
recent cases has inserted itself into the operational aspects of patent law. Since
there are no circuit splits requiring Supreme Court intervention into the
substantive side of patent law, the Court's interest reflects a broader concern for
the functioning of the system.
Plager, supranote 88, at 757.
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created the Federal Circuit for patent-law uniformity and harmonization purposes," 3
suggesting that the Federal Circuit has a right to claim an important stake in patent-law
reform. 1 4 The Court's actions indicate that it too can alter patent law, direct the
approaches to reforming the patent system, 15 fundamentally and substantively change
patent litigation in
the United States, and accomplish patent reforms at a quicker pace
6
than Congress."'
The Court's patent-reform decisions may be seen as an attempt to shift power from
Congress. 117 The Court's effort in patent-law reform, however, has limits."' The latest
round of patent-reform agendas advanced by various groups show that the issues
related to patents are vastly complex and intertwined." 9 Nonetheless, most of the
issues identified
and debated for reform are more appropriately decided by
20
Congress. 1

113. The creation of the Federal Circuit has led many to believe, for quite some time, that the
Federal Circuit was viewed as the "supreme" court of patent cases. See Mark D. Janis, Patent
Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 ("[T]he Federal

Circuit.. . has become the de facto supreme court of patents.").
114. See Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, The FederalCircuit and the Supreme

Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 828 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has increased its
interest in the Federal Circuit's patent-law jurisprudence, "including the Supreme Court's
increasing involvement with the 'mechanics' of the patent law"); Sarah King, Clearing the
Patent Ticket: The Supreme Court and Congress Undertake PatentReform, INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J., Sept. 2007, at 13, 13 (asserting that the Supreme Court has implemented patent
reform in two areas: "raising the quality of patents issued and curbing litigation abuse").
115. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 76, at 117-21 (2007) (noting that while other
countries will "use legislative solutions" in searching for new approaches to patents, "the
Supreme Court's foray into patent law suggests that the U.S. approach may be judicially

based").
116. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, PatentReform andDifferentialImpact, 8 MINN. J.L.
Sci. & TEcH. 1,2-3 (2007) (noting that while reform efforts are underway in the Supreme Court,
"efforts in Congress to implement patent reform legislation have repeatedly failed"). See
generally James R. Farrand, Shifting Patent Power: The Supreme Court Takes Up "Patent
Reform" Where Congress Fails to Act, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAw., Dec. 2006, at 1.
117. See generallyFarrand, supra note 116 (submitting that "evolving case law, rather than
new legislative mandates," has driven patent reform efforts).
118. See Nard &Dufly, supra note 77, at 1640 (observing that, although the Supreme Court
may attempt to provide a competitive check on the Federal Circuit, the Court is "at best a very
awkward institution" to do so because it "lacks a day-to-day familiarity with patent law doctrine,
and because of the Court's superior position in the judicial hierarchy, any dialogue between the
two institutions lacks the equipoise of peer debate").
119. See generally Rooklidge, supra note 8 (discussing the complexity of the patent-law-

reform approaches advocated by different interest groups).
120. See Nard & Dufly, supra note 77, at 1639 (noting that Congress, not the courts, should
intervene in the development of patent policy and cautioning that Congress should intervene
"only rarely").
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B. Congress and PatentReform

The Constitutional Convention of 1789 aimed to create a national patent system by
2
including a clause relating to patent and copyright in the Constitution itself.' ' Article I,
Section 8, authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights for a limited time to inventors
for their discoveries. 122 With that constitutional mandate and the recognition of the
importance of having a national patent system, the first Congress passed the Patent Act
of 1790.123 More than two hundred years later, Congress has the firm upper hand,
24
dictating the contours of American patent law.' Congress is where new patent bills
cases, passed by both the House and the
are introduced and debated and, in some
25
Senate to become the law of the nation.
1 26
Major changes to patent law, however, are few. The Patent Act of 1952,127 the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,128 with its creation of the Court of Appeals

121. See BUGBEE, supra note 11, at 126, 142-43 (discussing various proposals advanced at
the Constitutional Convention and discussing the Patent Act of 1790).
8. ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."). The exclusive rights in patents are property. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
261 (2006) ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property."); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,730 (2002) (stating that a patent monopoly "is a
property right"); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) ("[A]
patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly, [but rather a] patent is property."). Recent
debates on the patent grant illuminate the importance of patents and evaluate whether patents
have been protected as constitutional private property under the Takings Clause. See generally
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The HistoricalProtection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 690, 700-01 (2007) (tracing the
history of patents as constitutional private property).
123. Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); see, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Use andA buse ofHistory: The Supreme Court'sInterpretationof Thomas Jefferson'sInfluence
on the PatentLaw, 39 IDEA 195 (1999); see also Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents?Reevaluating the "PatentPrivilege'"in HistoricalContext,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 977-85 (2007) (discussing the patent "privilege" in the Founding
Era). Congress exercises its authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause to pass legislation
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that
the Patent and Copyright Clause "describes both the objective which Congress may seek and the
means to achieve it.... The objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts."); see
also Paul J.Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
PropertyClause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress,2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1153-54
(2000) (suggesting that under the Patent and Copyright Clause, Congress has the power to
prescribe appropriate legislative actions relating to patents and copyrights).
124. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Protectionof Database,82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1143
n.192 (2007) (noting that since enacting patent laws, Congress has ensured the exclusive
jurisdiction of patent actions in federal courts, "allowing for the development of a uniform body
of law in resolving the constant tension between private right and public access").
125. See, e.g., THOMAs P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM 1870-1970, at 150-80 (1989); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solitude: IntellectualPropertyLaw, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000).
126. See Daniel R. Cahoy, An IncrementalistApproach to PatentReform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J.
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for the Federal Circuit for exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 129 and the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999130 represent the notable sweeping changes
in patent law. The resulting federal body of patent law, codified in title 35 of the
United States Code, governs the landscape of patent law as it faces an ever changing
3
world of new technologies and business models.' 1
In recent years, Congress has faced pressure from different interest groups to
overhaul patent law,132particularly with regard to patent litigation. '13 During this time,
Congress has introduced many bills and held many hearings, but no comprehensive
patent-reform legislation has passed. On June 8, 2005, Representative Lamar Smith,
Chairman of Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, introduced the much anticipated H.R. 2795, the Patent Reform

LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 587, 638 n.210 (2006) (noting that the "last major overhaul of the patent

system in the United States was the Patent Act of 1952" and that the "most recent substantive
revision was the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999" (emphasis in original).
127. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 35 U.S.C.).
128. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 25 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).

129. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2006).
130. 35 U.S.C. §§ 5-6, 273, 297, 311-18 (2006).
131. See Daniel N. Kassabian, Researching Remedies in Intellectual Property Actions
Involving Computer Technology: A Research Guide, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 65,

102 (2002) (stating that, after the major revisions to American patent law in 1952, "Congress
has continually amended Title 35 of the U.S. Code, which contains these laws, to address new
legal and technical issues").
The legislative process and policymaking creates most patent law and limits judge-made
patent law. See Plager and Pettigrew, supra note 77, at 1737.
[T]he Patent Act, in which Congress, by the way in which it has written both the
structure and the detail of the legislation, has incorporated important basic policy
choices. It is certainly true that within such detailed legislation there nevertheless
may be broadly stated provisions, or provisions with broadly stated directives, that
are intended for agency implementation. Yet even in these cases, when the courts
are called upon to review a legislative gap through interpretation that has policy
overtones, the choices are constrained by the central policies reflected in the basic
legislative scheme, as well as by the self-imposed deference to the policy-fulfilling
role of the executive branch.
Id.
132. See generallyDonald S. Chisum, Reforming PatentLaw Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REv.
INTELL. PROP. L. 336 (identifying Microsoft's position on intellectual property and analyzing
notorious patent infringement cases that created the momentum for the comprehensive patent
law reform outcry today).
133. The recent patent-reform attempts in Congress seek to reduce patent protection for
patent holders in areas such as remedies and enhance the ability of alleged infringers to oppose
issued patents. See Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright PiratesandPatent Trolls: The
Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Law, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 690-91 (2007)

(finding that while copyright law reform legislation seeks to expand copyright protection, patent
reform legislation proposed during the 108th and 109th congressional sessions would greatly
decrease patent protection and "erect significant barriers to the enforcement of patent rights
including making it more difficult to obtain injunctive relief and creating additional

opportunities for third parties to oppose issued patents").
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13 5
major piece of legislation to reform the entire patent system.

Powerful interest groups intensified their lobbying efforts, which immediately led to a
different version of the bill, known as the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to
H.R. 2795,136 being introduced on July 26, 2005.137
The Senate also introduced its own version of national patent-law reform relating to
H.R. 2795 during the 109th Congress. On August 3, 2006, Senators Orin Hatch and
Patrick Leahy introduced S.3818, known as the Patent Reform Act of 2006.138 Not
surprisingly, with so many divergent interests expressed in the different provisions of
the proposed bills, the 109th Congress ended without further action on S. 3818 or H.R.
2795. 139
Subsequently, in the 110th Congress, S.1145140 and H.R. 1908 14' were introduced in
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively. These bills became known
as the "Patent Reform Act of 2007." The House passed its version of the bill, but the
Senate had not taken any action on the bill by the summer of 2008.142 This legislative
stalemate prompted Senator Patrick Leahy, the bill's sponsor, to express his
.43
disappointment that the Senate could not come together to reform the patent system
Congress's attempts to drastically reform patent law have not been successful
largely due to the opposing interests of the various industry sectors regarding patents
and innovation. 144 For instance, large software and technology companies have been

134. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795 109th Cong. (2005).
135. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescriptionfor Patent Reform, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318,318 (2007) (stating that H.R. 2795 "not only would have
changed the rules pursuant to the way that patents are procured, enforced, and challenged, they
would have fundamentally altered the requirements for a patentable invention").
136. H.R.2795.
137. See Patent Act Hearing,supra note 8; see also Holman, supra note 135, at 322
(explaining that the substitute "retreated from a number of the changes proposed in the original
legislation by eliminating the provisions relating to injunctive relief, continuation practice, and
second-window post-grant opposition procedures" and revising the damage apportionment
provision).
138. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S.3818, 109th Cong. (2006).
139. Representative Berman also introduced his own legislation to reform the patent system
on April 5, 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006), but no further action was taken on Berman's
bill.
140. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
141. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
142. S.1145 [110th]: Patent Reform Act of 2007 (GovTrack.us), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-1145.
143. Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Comment on Patent Reform Legislation (April 10,
2008), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200804/041008b.html. ("I am disappointed that just a
handful of words have stalled the Senate's debate on this important patent legislation. We have
been working on these reforms for years. Thousands of hours have been spent in negotiations to
address the concerns of 100 Senators, hundreds of Representatives, and dozens of stakeholders.
This was a missed opportunity. I have said repeatedly that the time for patent reform is now.
Unfortunately, some have yet to fully grasp this fact, and have stalled meaningful reform.").
144. See Rooklidge, supranote 8, at 10, 13 (noting that different interest groups with stakes
in patent law reform and lobbied for their various versions of patent reform); cf Robert A.
Armitage, The Myth of Inherent andInevitable "Industry Differences": "Diversity" as Artifact
in the Quest for Patent Reforms, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 401, 419 (2007)

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:449

actively advocating for a weaker patent system, claiming that existing strong patent
protection discourages innovation.145 These companies have asserted that the current
patent system provides too much power to holding companies whose existence depends
on purchasing patents and suing others for infringement, thereby threatening extensive
and expensive patent litigation against the technology industry. 146 Over the years, they
have aggressively lobbied Congress to weaken the patent system. Their lobbying
47
efforts culminated in H.R. 1908 and S. 1145, which were viewed as antipatent bills.1
Other groups, such as pharmaceutical companies, favor a strong patent system to
protect their long and costly investment in the development ofpatented drugs.148 These

groups oppose a weak patent system because patents are both critical and necessary to
their industries.' 49Additionally, the small technology sector and small inventor groups

(challenging the belief that inherent and inevitable "industry differences" is the motive for
patent reforms).
145. See Rooklidge, supra note 8, at 13-15 (explaining that the patent reform proposal
advanced by the Business Software Alliance would weaken the patent system). Some technology
companies do not want to see software patent protection because these companies would be
burdened by the high cost of defending against patent infringement suits. See Public Hearing on
Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions Before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, at 17 (1994), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/
hearings/software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf (statement of Douglas Brotz, Principal Scientist, Adobe
Systems, Inc) (stating that software patents have harmed Adobe, as illustrated in a suit brought
by Information International Inc. where Adobe spent and $4.5 million dollars in legal fees and
litigation expenses over five years).
146. See Robert A. Armitage, The Conundrum Confronting Congress: The Patent System
Must Be Left UntouchedWhile Being RadicallyReformed, 5 J.MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.

268, 273 (2006) (observing that "the challenge" Congress faces is how to reform patent law that
addresses the imbalances and unfairness identified by the tech industry, "but leave[s] the
effectiveness of the patent system untouched").
147. See Kirsch and Mancino, supranote 74, at 7.
148. See Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, the "PatentAct of2005":
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.

Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 20-34 (2005) (statement of Robert B. Chess, speaking on
behalf of Biotech Industry Organization).
149. The Biotech Industry asserts that intellectual property protection is "the key factor for
economic growth and advancement in the biotechnology sector." Letter from Sara Radcliffe,
Managing Dir. Sci. and Regulatory Affairs, Biotechnology Indus. Org., to Linda Olsson,
European Meds. Agency (June 5, 2005), available at http://www.bio.org/reg/20050617.pdf.
The Biotechnology Industry Organization, along with other biotechnology and pharmaceutical
organizations, has also made some observations on patent reform efforts and cautioned
unilateral changes without objective empirical evidence on patents:
While we welcome efforts to make improvements to the U.S. patent system, we
must make clear our opposition to S. 1145 as approved by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. This bill contains provisions that will create uncertainty and weaken
the enforceability of validly issued patents. Some of the proposed reform
provisions, such as an expanded apportionment of damages, an indefinite postgrant opposition process, excessive venue restrictions, burdensome and expensive
mandatory search requirements, and unworkable interlocutory appeal provisions,
pose serious negative consequences for continued innovation and American
technological leadership in a competitive global economy. In addition, the bill
codifies the current inequitable conduct doctrine rather than to make broadly
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strongly oppose the proposed patent-litigation-reform legislation, arguing that the
problems related to patent litigation have been exaggerated and that the proposed
150
legislation would encourage more patent disputes, not reduce them. The failure of
has resulted in the stalling of
different sectors to compromise on a wide range of issues
151
patent law reform in recent congressional sessions.
52
a quiet
While Congress fails to pass legislation reforming the patent system,
patent reform movement has emerged at the local level to curb patent abuses, curtail
protracted patent litigation, and increase the expertise of judges in handling patent
cases across America.

supported reforms to eliminate litigation abuse of the doctrine and gain increases
in patent quality.
No compelling case has been made for a bill written in this fashion. It is based
on claims of a crisis in the current patent system that does not exist, supported by
selective assertions which do not hold up under scrutiny. Importantly, the bill fails
to take into account the impact of numerous court decisions and administrative
rules that have occurred recently regarding major patent issues. We believe the
authors of the legislation must make fundamental changes to the legislation if it is
to work for all American innovators, and we urge you not to consider the bill on
the Senate floor unless such changes are made.
Letter from the Biotechnology Industry Organization and Other Biopharmaceutical
Organizations to Harry Reid, Senator, and Mitch McConnell, Senator (Oct. 23, 2007), available
at http://bio.org/ip/domestic/20071023.pdf.
150. Patent Quality Improvement Hearing,supra note 34, at 142 (statement of Nathan P.
Myhrvold, Chief Executive Officer, Intellectual Ventures). Myhrvold made the following
observations:
So, while I can understand the frustration that my colleagues in large technology
companies have, the reality is that the impact of these lawsuits is exaggerated.
Some horror stories exist, but they are rare. The magnitude of the supposed
problem is not borne out by the statistics.
I was curious, so I did a study counting the total number of lawsuits filed
against technology companies by entities that do not produce products. The total
of all these lawsuits over the last five years was just over 2% of all patent lawsuits.
Furthermore, fully half of those lawsuits are from one very litigious company.
Those horror stories aren't about an epidemic, or a situation that is out of
control-it is actually a very minor phenomenon. I also counted the number of
patent lawsuits in which a large technology company was the plaintiff-the result
is 1.6%. Large technology companies generate nearly as many lawsuits as the
entities that have no products.
These numbers put some perspective on the problem. On one hand, we have
the potential to harm tens of thousands of small inventors. On the other hand we
have the supposed benefit-to reduce the total number of lawsuits by perhaps one
percent. It seems clear that the cure is far worse than the disease.
Id.
151. See Holman, supra note 135, at 318 (stating that the sweeping reform did not gather
support from the biotech industry and other constituencies affected by changes to the status quo,
stalling the proposed legislation).
152. See Mark Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 900-04 (2007)
(cautioning that large-scale patent-law reform is difficult as seen through the history of patent
reforms).
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IV. LOCALISM AND PATENT REFORM

A. A Local Movement for Local Patent Rules

Local patent and intellectual property bar associations across the United States have
witnessed a relatively modest increase in the number ofpatent cases,153 the complexity
of the technology, the complexity of patent law, the lengthiness of litigation,' 54 and the
cost of litigation.'55 These bar associations were aware for years that patent cases were
primarily concentrated on the East and West Coasts, notably in the Eastern District1of
56
Virginia, the District of Delaware, and the Northern District of California.
Consequently, the expertise of the judges presiding over patent cases in those districts
has developed significantly because they have had more opportunities than other
judges to preside over patent cases. 157 Judges and patent attorneys in districts outside
California and Virginia have recently decided to curb abuses in patent litigation,

153. See generallyJoseph P. Cook, On Understandingthe Increaseof PatentLitigation, 9

AM. L. &ECON. REV. 48 (2007) (claiming that understanding the increases in patent litigation
will help scholars identify emerging trends in technology innovation).
154. See Robert Greene Sterne & Edward J. Kessler, Patent Protectionfor Computer-

Related Technology: An InternationalStrategy, in ELECTRONIC AND COMPUTER PATENT LAW 23,
32 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 292,
1990) ("[T]he length and complexity of U.S. originated patent applications on computer-related
technology has significantly increased due to the concomitant increase in complexity of the
technology being covered by the applications."). Highly complex technology litigation also
faces high reversal rates on appeal. See Cheryl L. Johnson, Why Judges Are Destinedto Flunk
Their Markman Tests: The History of Their Claim Construction Assignments, in How TO
PREPARE & CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2006, at 9, 63 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course

Handbook Series No. G-873, 2006) (noting various empirical evidence supporting the high
reversal rate in complex technology cases).
155. See Joseph Scott Miller, EnhancingPatentDisclosureforFaithfulClaim Construction,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 198 (2005) (reporting that, according to the American

Intellectual Property Law Association's biennial survey in 2004, "the national median cost of a
full patent trial in which $1 to $25 million is at risk is $2 million per side, i.e., $4 million"); see
also Johnson, supra note 154, at 67 (indicating that, based on the American Intellectual
Property Law Association's Report of the Economic Survey 2005, the median litigation cost in
patent cases in which more than $25 million is at risk is $4.5 million).
156. See Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to Change the PatentReexamination Statute to
Eliminate UnnecessaryLitigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 887, 897 (1994).

157. For example, Judge Roderick McKelvie of the District of Delaware possessed
significant patent-law experience, and he innovated the handling of patent cases on his docket.
His innovations led to more patent cases filed in the District of Delaware. See William P.
DiSalvatore, FilingConsiderationsin PatentLitigation, in PATENT

LITIGATION

2001, at 81, 98

(PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series, No. G-669, 2001) (stating that Judge
McKelvie encouraged the growth of patent cases by reforming the way patent cases were
litigated in the District of Delaware, such as eliminating sidebars during jury trials, prohibiting
long and argumentative objections, limiting the trial of patent cases to twenty to twenty-five
hours per side, and creating an Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property, which explored
adjudicating intellectual property cases more efficiently).
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increase58 the expertise of local judges in patent cases, and create new centers for patent
1
cases.
Local judges and patent bars understand that they do not have the authority to
reform substantive patent law, because Congress has the sole authority to pass patent
legislation. 59 Nevertheless, local judges and patent bars can work together to
60
districts.'
formulate local procedural rules regarding patent cases litigated in their

158. For example, the District of Minnesota appointed an Advisory Committee to make
recommendations on local patent rules. The Committee consisted ofjudges and local attorneys.
Press Release, Proposed Local Rule Amendments for Public Comment (Sept. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/public comment.pdf [hereinafter
Minnesota Patent Committee] (listing the Committee members recommending the Local Patent
Rules for the District of Minnesota).The Committee recommended a set of local patent rules and
explained that the rules "ease. simplify, and reduce the cost of patent practice in the District of
Minnesota. Patent cases are frequently complex. These Rules are designed to streamline the pretrial and claim construction processes." Id.
The Committee had the following objectives in recommending the local patent rules:
1. Reducing the cost and burden of patent litigation in Minnesota without
sacrificing fairness.
2. Promoting consistency and certainty in how patent cases are handled in
Minnesota.
3. Addressing issues that are recurring in most patent cases and that all litigants
and the Courts have some common interests in managing by rule, in particular
disclosure, discovery, and claim construction issues.
4. Promoting the greatest and most accessible understanding of patent issues and
technical issues by litigants, Courts, and juries.
5. Minimizing the discovery procedural disputes that often lead to the same
outcome and could be resolved at less cost and burden, at least presumptively, by
rule rather than by motion.
6. Discouraging expensive and/or burdensome litigation procedures that do not
substantially contribute to the resolution of patent cases.

Id.
159. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (stating that
Congress enacted the first patent law in 1790 and "ever since that time has fixed the condition
upon which patents ... shall be granted. These laws, like other laws of the United States enacted
pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land." (citation omitted)).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 83; see Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 135859 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 83(b)) ("A judge may regulate practice in any manner
consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and local rules of
the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any
requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district rules."); see also McKesson
Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2007);
Townshend Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Broadcom Corp., No. C 06-05118 JF (RS), 2007 WL
1994158, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2007) (explaining that the local patent rule governing
preliminary infringement, (as opposed to invalidity) cases, "has been described as a
'streamlined' mechanism to replace the 'series of interrogatories that defendants would likely
have propounded' in its absence" (citing Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C01-2079-VRW, 2002 WL 32126128, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2002))); Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (concurring with the Northern
District of California that local patent rules "are designed to streamline the discovery process"
and "provide structure to discovery and enable the parties to move efficiently toward claim
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Through hard work and cooperative effort, local judges and lawyers can create and
adopt sets of comprehensive local patent rules.
The movement for the creation and adoption of local patent rules originated at the
district level, where judges and local bar members share a common desire to streamline
patent litigation in their respective districts. 161For instance, judges and members of the
62
Illinois patent bar formed a group to propose local rules for patent cases.1
Subsequently, public meetings were held 163 and comments were solicited for the
leading to the adoption
proposed local patent rules.164 Debates and revisions followed,
65
of the Patent Rules for the Northern District of Illinois.'
Local patent rules are innovative. 166 They control the schedule of litigation and
dictate a faster pace. For example, under many local rules, a patent holder asserting
patent infringement has a very short time (ten to thirty days after the initial casemanagement conference) to submit its preliminary infringement contentions.' 67 The

construction and the eventual resolution of their dispute"); IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power
Tech., Inc., No. C 02-03942 MHP, 2004 WL 1368860, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2004) ("The
Local [Patent] Rules exist to further the goal of full, timely discovery and provide all parties
with adequate notice and information with which to litigate their cases, not to create supposed
loopholes through which parties may practice litigation by ambush.").
161. See Suncast Techs., L.L.C. v. Patrician Prods., Inc., No. 07-80414-CIV, 2008 WL
179648, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2008) ("[T]he Court has reviewed the Patent Local Rules of the
Northern District of California, the Patent Local Rules of the Northern District of Georgia, the
Court of Federal Claims's Standard Special Procedures Order for Cases under 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a), the Local Patent Rules of Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania, and Appendix
M to the Local Rules of the Eastern District of Texas, Rules of Practice for Patent Cases....
[T]he resolutions suggested by the various local patent rules embody the collective wisdom and
experience of groups ofjudges and practicing patent lawyers who, on repeated occasions, have
addressed the very discovery issues covered by the local patent rules.").
162. See Lynne Marek, Chicago Attorneys the Latest to Seek a More PredictablePatent
System, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 3, 2008.
163. See IPLAC Presents Seminar on ProposedLocal Patent Rules for The Northern
Districtof Illinois, INTELL. PROP. TODAY.COM, Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.iptoday.com/

news-archived-article.asp?id=3812&type=ip (reporting on the announcement of the public
meeting conducted by judges and lawyers on the proposed local patent rules).
164. See Marek, supra note 162.
165. N.D. ILL. LocAL PATENT R., availableat http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/ assets/

_documents/Rules/localpatentrules-preamble.pdf. The Northern District of Illinois voted on
March 19, 2009, to adopt the proposed local patent rules. See U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.,
Proposal to Amend the Local Rules, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/-assets/_documents/
Rules/Patent.pdf.
166. See J. Christopher Carraway, Discovery Issues in PatentCases, in PATENT LMGATION
2007, at 353, 361-63 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-910, 2007)
(providing a flowchart of the local patent rules to illustrate how swiftly patent cases are moving
through the court system); see also Fred Berretta & Joe Reisman, Southern District Rolls Out
New Patent Local Rules (Sept. 2006), http://www.kmob.com/pdf/sodistrict-rollsoutRules.htm
(explaining the various sections of the local patent rules adopted by the Southern District of
California in 2006).
167. E.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 3-1 ("Not later than 10 days after the Initial Case
Management Conference, a party claiming patent infringement shall serve on all parties a
'Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions."'); N.D. GA. PATENT L.R. 4.4 ("A
plaintiff pleading infringement of a patent shall first make its Disclosure of Inf-ingement
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preliminary infringement contentions are deemed final and patentees can only amend
their contentions without leave of the court within a narrow time frame. 68 Likewise, a
defendant's preliminary invalidity contentions are deemed final, and infringement
contentions can only be amended with the court's permission upon a showing of good
cause. 169 Most local patent rules allow discovery related to the charges and defenses of
willful infringement, and they encourage
parties to explore the basis for raising claims
70
shortly after the scheduling order.'
To minimize unnecessary battles over protective orders, some local patent rules
have a default protective order. The default protective order is automatically entered
upon the filing of a patent suit. 17 1 Having default protective 72
orders shortens the time

required to reach a protective order suitable to both parties.
Another feature of many local patent rules is their swift timetable for claim
construction. Several districts' local patent rules allow only twenty days for the parties
to exchange preliminary construction for each claim term identified, and each party
must disclose extrinsic evidence to support their claim construction. 7 3 Again, the quick
Contentions within thirty (30) days after filing of the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery
Plan."); E.D. TEX. P. R. 3-1 ("Not later than 10 days before the Initial Case Management
Conference with the Court, a party claiming patent infringement must serve on all parties a
'Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions."').
168. See Carraway, supranote 166, at 361; see also E.D. TEx. P.R. 3-6.
169. See, e.g., E.D. TEx. P. R. 3-8; see also Carraway, supra note 166, at 361. Preliminary
invalidity contentions are final except that a party may amend "if a party claiming patent
infringement has served amended infringement contentions . . . or 'Final Infringement

Contentions,"' or the alleged infringer believes in good faith that the Court's Markman ruling so
requires. E.D. TEx. P. R. 3-6(c).
170. For example, the Committee for the District of Minnesota's Patent Local Rules
explained the genesis of its innovative discovery rule:
Paragraph (c) allows discovery related to a charge of willful infringement and to
defenses of invalidity and unenforceability, such as the defense of inequitable
conduct, without pleading of those defenses, in order to encourage parties to
explore whether there is a substantial basis for such pleading before pleading
them. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has commented that "the habit
of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague." Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.

Cir. 1988). The Committee considered a proposal to require leave of the Court for
pleading inequitable conduct or willflulness, similar to Minn. Stat. § 549.191
(2003), but concluded that the power of the Court to dismiss such allegations
under Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided an
existing tool for management of insufficient charges of inequitable conduct or
willfulness.
Minnesota Patent Committee, supra note 158.
171. E.g., W.D. PA. LPR 2.2 ("Such Protective Order shall be deemed automatically entered

upon the filing or transfer of any civil action to which these Local Patent Rules, apply pursuant
to LPR 1.3, unless otherwise modified by agreement of the parties or Order of Court.").
172. Cf W.D. PA. LPR 2.2 app. A (providing an example automatic protective order).
173. E.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4-2; N.D. GA. PATENT L.R. 6.1; E.D. TEX. P. R. 4-2; see
also Carraway, supra note 166, at 361. These rules permit that, within twenty days of
exchanging terms, parties shall exchange preliminary construction for each term identified, and
each party shall identify extrinsic evidence relied upon to support their claim construction,
including dictionary definitions, citations to treatises, and brief descriptions of witness
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timetable1forces
the litigants to plan, manage, and control the litigation to meet the
74
deadline.

Together, these rules prevent the parties from prolonging litigation with
acrimonious procedural tactics. Indeed, a typical patent case takes approximately three
to five years from filing to disposition. However, the time can be reduced to eighteen
months, as shown by the district courts that have 75adopted and enforced local patent
rules to resolve patent disputes with rapid speed.
The local-patent-rules movement has been widespread. In 2000, the Northern
District of California was the first to formulate and adopt local patent rules. 176 Nine
years later, the Southern District of Ohio, 77 the District of Minnesota, 178 the District of
Massachusetts, 179 the Northern District of Illinois,' 80 the Eastern District of North
Carolina,' 81 the District of New Jersey,1 82 the Northern District of Georgia,

83

the

85

Southern District of Texas,'84 the Eastern District of Texas,' the Western District of
Washington, 86 the Western District of Pennsylvania, 187 and the Southern District of
California' 88 have all adopted their own versions of local patent rules or developed
testimony. N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4-2; N.D. GA. PATENT L.R. 6.1; E.D. TEx. P. R. 4-2.

174. See Minnesota Patent Committee, supra note 158, at 2 (stating that the local patent
rules will minimize "the discovery procedural disputes that often lead to the same outcome and
could be resolved at less cost and burden, at least presumptively, by rule rather than by motion
[in addition to d]iscouraging expensive and/or burdensome litigation procedures that do not
substantially contribute to the resolution of patent cases").
175. See McFadyen, supranote 52, at 5 (noting that patent cases are "typically resolved in
about fourteen to eighteen months" in the Eastern District of Texas).
176. See Posting of Edward Reines to Patently-O Blog, http://www.patentlyo.con
patent/2008/02/northem-distri.html (Feb. 3, 2008, 15:46 EST) (providing that the Northern
District of California "pioneered the first set of patent rules in 2001").
177. S.D. OH. PAT. L.R., available at http://www.ohsd.uscourts.Gov/localrules/
ohsdpatentrules.pdf.
178. D. MINN. L.R., available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/localrules/pdfdoc/local
_ules.pdf.
179. D.MASS. L. R. 16.6, availableat http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/pdf/PubNoticeNewPatent-LR16.600 I.pdf.
180. N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R., availableat http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/_assets/
_documents/Rules/localpatentrules-preanble.pdf.
181. LOCAL PATENT RuLES 301-05, EDNC, available at http://www.nced.uscourts.gov/
flashhtml/LocalRules/Civil Rules/PatentRules/Rule 301.1 .htm.
182. D.N.J. L. PAT. R., availableat http http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/rules/completeRuies-11-09.pdf
183. N.D. GA. PATENT L.R., available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/pdf/NDGARules
Patent.pdf.
184. S.D. TEX. P. R., available at http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/district/rulesproc/patent/
rules.pdf
185. E.D. TEX. P. R., available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules/
Documents/Appendix%20M.pdf.
186. W.D. WASH. LocAL PATENT R., availableat http:llwww.wawd.uscourts.gov/documents/
HomePageAnnouncements/LocalGeneralRules/Local%20Patent%2oRules.pdf
187. W.D. PA. LPR., available at http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/
Irmanual.pdf.
188. S.D. CAL. PATENT L.R., availableathttp://www.casd.uscourts.gov/uploads/Rules/Local
%20Rules/LocalRules.pdf.
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patent-specific rules within their existing local rules. 189 The Northern District of Texas
has adopted patent rules in a standing order.' 90 In some districts, such as the Southern
District of New York, local patent rules have not been adopted for the entire district;
however, individual
judges may adopt the recommended set of local patent rules on a
19
voluntary basis. '
Overall, the movement in creating and adopting local patent rules has had positive
effects on judges sitting in districts with no local patent rules. Some judges have
observed the benefits of the rules and decided to use some of the rules to manage their
court's ongoing patent dockets. For example, in Suncast Technologies v. Patrician

Products,192 the Southern District of Florida reviewed local patent rules from a number
of districts and found that the rules "provide instructive insight into identifying proper
193
topics of discovery unique to a patent suit,"'
which assisted the court to adopt "the
94
discovery.
patent
of
sequencing"
correct
B. DistrictJudges: Instrumentalto Local Patent Reform
The local-patent-rules movement reflects the local interests ofjudges who want to
address how patent cases should be managed on their dockets. In certain districts, some
judges have observed that having local patent rules is essential to the administration of
patent cases in their dockets; the rules reduce the lengthy and drawn-out process of
costly discovery. 195 In other districts, there are judges with a strong interest in presiding
over patent cases. 196 They welcome patent cases to their districts because they enjoy

189. See John N. Zarian, PatentLitigation in the U.S. Districtof Idaho,ADVOCATE (Idaho),

Aug.-Sept. 2007, at 33 n.28 (noting that at least seven judicial districts have adopted local
patent rules); Carraway, supra note 166, at 360-61 (listing the district courts with local patent
rules).
190. Miscellaneous Order No. 62 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 2 2007), available at
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/pdf/misc orders/misc62_4-2-07.pdf. The Dallas Division ofthe
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas has adopted patent rules through
an order as part of a "pilot project." Id "The rules of practice established in [Miscellaneous
Order No. 62] will be carefully reviewed for editorial and substantive changes ... if later
considered for adoption as local rules." Id. at n. 1.
191. See N.Y. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, PROPOSED LOCAL PATENT RULES FOR THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUrHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YoRK, at i (2006), available at

http://www.nyipla.org/Bulletin/InsertProposedRules.pdf; Charles A. Shaw-United States
District Judge, http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/judges/cas.html.
192. No. 07-80414-CIV, 2008 WL 179648 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2008).

193. Id. at *9.

194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Wacom Co. v. Hanvon Corp., No. C06-5701RJB, 2007 WL 4111396, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 16, 2007) ("[T]he deterioration of an agreement to follow the proposed Local
Patent Rules creates the exact opposite of a streamlined process, resulting in the consideration of

additional motions and expense of other litigation inefficiencies. It is extremely unfortunate that
this situation has become an example of the need for Local Patent Rules.").

196. Judges known to welcome patent cases are Judge Thomas Ward of the Eastern District
of Texas, and Judge Ed Kinkeade of the Northern District of Texas. See generally Jordan T.
Fowles & Tung T. Nguyen, Texas Litigators Go to Lake Tahoe, ST. B. TEX. (Intell. Prop. L.
Sec., Special Issue, Advanced Pat. Litig. Course) 2007, at 2, available at
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the intellectual challenge patent cases offer to their dockets. 197 They believe that having
a set of innovative local patent rules will encourage additional patent cases to be filed
in their districts because such cases will be resolved in accordance with a swift time
1 98
frame.
1. Streamlining the Process and Shaping Litigants' Conduct
As judges strictly enforce local patent rules, litigants are no longer free to abuse the
litigation process with delaying tactics and prolonging their cases on the docket. 199
http://www.texasbariplaw.org/newsletters/2007 LakeTahoeCourse.pdf (reporting Judge Ed
Kinkeade's invitation to the practicing patent bar to file patent suits in his court); Michael C.
Smith, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases, 69 TEX. B.J.
1045, 1045 (2006) (stating what Judge T. John Ward had done with respect to welcoming patent
cases filed in his division), available at http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfln?Section=
Texas Bar Joumall&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfn&ContentlD=16286.
197. See Roderick R. McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report,
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Aug. 2007, at 1, 3 (noting that several district courts have "hung out
a welcome sign for patent cases by expressing interest in the cases, forming advisory
committees, or adopting local rules"); Tim McGlone, Departing Judge Ready to Leave Gun,
Drug Cases Behind, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 15, 2008, at B3, available at
http://hamptonroads.com/2008/02/resigning-judge-says-he-was-tired-drug-and-gun-cases
(reporting that U.S. District Judge Walter D. Kelley Jr. enjoyed complex patent cases more than
drug and gun cases). For another example of judges enjoying patent cases, as reflected in the
posting of poems about patents from the Eastern District of Texas, see Eastern District of Texas
Federal Court Practice: Holiday Patent Humor from the Chambers of Judge Davis,
http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern district-of texas/2005/12/holiday_patent_.html.
198. Cf Sam Williams, A Haven for Patent Pirates, TECH. REV., Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.technologyreview.com/read article.aspx?id=16280&ch-infotech (stating that Judge
Ward's firm enforcement of the local patent rules propel the Eastern District of Texas to become
the center of patent cases). See generally McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., 495
F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Townshend Intellectual Prop., L.L.C. v. Broadcom
Corp., No. C 06-05118 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1994158, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2007) (explaining
that the local patent rule governing preliminary infringement (as opposed to invalidity)
contentions "has been described as a 'streamlined' mechanism to replace the 'series of
interrogatories that defendants would likely have propounded' in its absence" (quoting Network
Caching Tech. LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C-01-2079-VRW, 2002 WL 32126128, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 12,2002))); Am. Video Graphics, L.P. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (E.D.
Tex. 2005) (concurring with Northern District of California that patent local rules "are designed
to streamline the discovery process" and "provide structure to discovery and enable the parties
to move efficiently toward claim construction and the eventual resolution of their dispute");
IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Tech., Inc., No. C 02-03942 MHP, 2004 WL 1368860, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 16, 2004) ("The Local [Patent] Rules exist to further the goal of full, timely
discovery and provide all parties with adequate notice and information with which to litigate
their cases, not to create supposed loopholes through which parties may practice litigation by
ambush.").
199. See, e.g., NessCap Co. v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 07cv0704-JLS (BLM), 2008 WL
152147, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) (rejecting the defendant Maxwell's argument that
service of the Gallay and Miller declarations satisfied its obligations under Patent Local Rule
3.4(a)); Computer Acceleration Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-CV-140, 2007 WL
2584827, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2007) ("[The patentee] wasted countless hours attempting,
in effect, to advance the untenable position that the local patent rules and the court's scheduling
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Local patent rules have made an impact on litigants' conduct in patent-infringement
cases. If litigants ignore the local patent rules, the consequences can be disastrous, as
seen in some of the cases wherein the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal20 of
patent0
infringement cases when the litigants failed to obey the local patent rules.
For example, in 02 Micro InternationalLtd. v. Monolithic PowerSystems, Inc.,201
the plaintiff patent holder's three-month delay between discovering a new infringement
theory and moving for leave to amend its final infringement contentions lacked
sufficient diligence to satisfy the local patent rule's requirement of "good cause" for
the amendment.20 2 The district court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion on noninfringement grounds and denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend its infringement contentions. 0 3 The plaintiff challenged the district court's
2°4
ruling, but the Federal Circuit affirmed, dismissing the patent infringement claim.
Similarly, in Safeclick, LLC v. Visa InternationalService Ass'n,2°s the plaintiff
patent holder did not present its new infringement theory until it opposed the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on noninfringement grounds. 206 The district
court found no good cause for the plaintiff to raise its new infringement theory and
granted summary judgment for defendant.2 7 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that
there was no abuse of discretion by the district court and affirmed the grant of
summary judgment. 208
The affirmation by the Federal Circuit lends powerful credence to the local judges'
rulings related to noncompliance with the local patent rules. All have a positive effect
on the lawyers' behavior. The lawyers' behavior changes since they must conduct their
cases in compliance with the local patent rules for fear of receiving a reprimand or
sanction from the court or-in some instances-jeopardizing their client's chances to
succeed.209 Consequently, parties in patent infringement litigation will have their cases

order are mere suggestions. Discovery is not a game in which each party plays a card and waits
for the opponent's and the court's response before deigning to release another. Such antics...
especially assail customary and expected practice in the Eastern District of Texas."); Safeclick,
LLC v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 208 F. App'x 829 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
200. E.g., 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., 467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1361-62.
203. Id.

204. Id. at 1367-68 (evaluating the district court's ruling and rationale).
205. 208 F. App'x 829 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
206. Id.
at 833.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 835.
209. Strict enforcement of local patent rules will curb litigation costs. Delay tactics and

failure to comply with deadlines relating to patent-infringement contentions will have an impact
on the outcome of litigation. See, e.g., Safeclick, 208 F. App'x at 829 (dismissing patentinfringement claim on untimely new patent-infringement theories); 02 Micro int' Ltd., 467
F.3d at 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (dismissing patent-infringement claims on delayed new
infringement theories); see also Eric W. Bass & Jeffrey M. Fisher, Federal Circuit Affirns:
Local Patent Rules Have Strong Bite, IPFRONTLINE, Dec.
19, 2006,
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=13694&deptid=4 (reporting the Federal
Circuit's affirmation of the district court's patent infringement rulings related to local patent
rules).
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resolved without years of languishing and uncertainty.21 °
2. Enhancing Judicial Expertise
Local patent-law reform has allowed for the enhancement ofjudicial expertise in the
patent area. As more patent cases are filed and subsequently disposed of in a timely
fashion,21' judges in districts with local patent rules have more opportunities to
enhance their judicial expertise in patent law and their skills in presiding over patent
cases. 212 This enhancement will assist in rectifying a chronic problem identified by
many commentators--district judges lack the legal knowledge or technical expertise
required to accurately construe patent claims.213 The problem had led to a high reversal
rate by the Federal Circuit on claim-construction decisions.2t 4 Having knowledgeable

210. See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Sys. Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380-81
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (explaining that the Northern District of Georgia's Local Patent Rules require
plaintiffs in patent cases "to disclose a great deal of extremely detailed information" and that any
"plaintiff filing a patent case in this district knows that these disclosures must be made early");
IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Tech., Inc., No. C 02-03942 MHP, 2004 WL 1368860, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 16, 2004) ("The Local [Patent] Rules exist to further the goal of full, timely
discovery and provide all parties with adequate notice and information with which to litigate
their cases, not to create supposed loopholes through which parties may practice litigation by
ambush"); see also Townshend Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Broadcom Corp., No. C 06-05118 JF
(RS), 2007 WL 1994158, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2007) (explaining that the patent local rule
governing preliminary infringement contentions "has been described as a 'streamlined'
mechanism to replace the 'series of interrogatories that defendants would likely have
propounded' in its absence" (quoting Network Caching Tech. LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C-012079-VRW, 2002 WL 32126128, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2002))).
211. See Zarian,supra note 189, at 33 n. 16 (noting that in fiscal year 2006, by rank order,
the top 10 districts for patent filings were the Central District of California (281), Eastern
District of Texas (216), Northern District of California (161), District of New Jersey (142),
District of Delaware (139), Northern District of Illinois (138), Southern District of New York
(135), District of Massachusetts (80), Northern District of Georgia (76), and Southern District of
Florida (68)).
212. See Suncast Techs., L.L.C. v. Patrician Prods., Inc., No. 07-80414-CIV, 2008 WL
179648, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2008) (recognizing the wisdom and experience ofjudges in
various district courts embodied in local patent rules in managing patent cases and discovery
processes).
213. See generallyJeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction,Appeal, and the Predictabilityof

InterpretiveRegimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1033, 1035-36 (2007) (discussing recent proposals
to change the way patent claims are handled). Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) made the
following observation: "Prior to coming to Congress, I was part of a number of patent suits. I
was often struck by the fact that many district court judges either knew little of the applicable
law, or did not understand the technology involved." Press Release, Representative Darrell Issa,
Issa and Schiff Introduce Legislation to Improve Patent Litigation in District Courts (May 19,
2006), http://issa.house.gov/index.cfin?FuseAction=News.PressReleases&ContentRecord-id=
34D98169-6511-4145-849E-A8035C348725.
214. See generally Lefstin, supra note 213, at 1035-36; Press Release, Issa, supranote 213
(stating that the reversal rate was roughly forty percent of all patent appeals of district court
decisions).
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judges will reduce the cost of litigation by reducing the reversal rate. 21 5 Having more
district judges with patent expertise is important to the administration ofjustice in an
area of law that is often so complex and difficult that many judges generally do not feel
comfortable adjudicating.216
C. Other Impactsfrom Local Patent Reform

In addition to the obvious positive results stemming from local patent reform with
respect to streamlining patent litigation, reducing litigation costs, resolving cases with
certainty, and enhancing judicial expertise, there are other impacts not yet identified
thus far.
1. Creating Knowledgeable Districts for Patent Cases
One result of local-patent-reform expansion is the spread ofjudicial awareness and
knowledge in patent law and case management. As courts from different parts of the
nation embrace patent cases, as seen with the creation, adoption, and enforcement of
local patent rules, the patent expertise of the judges is no longer concentrated in just
California and Virginia. 21 7 Judicial know-how and expertise are dispersed throughout
different regions, transforming a small district or division of a district into an
adjudication center with strong patent expertise.218
Judges accumulate their knowledge and skills by building their reputation among
patent litigants. 219 They are rewarded for their innovation in adjudicating patent cases
swiftly via the implementation of their local patent rules resulting in an increase in the

number of patent cases filed in their district.220 Adjudication centers for patents have
attracted attention at the national level. 221For example, national news media report and

215. See McFadyen, supra note 52, at 57-58 (reporting that the Federal Circuit "has never
reversed a decision" by Judges Ward and Davis of the Eastern District of Texas as these two
judges are known for their expertise in handling patent cases along with strict enforcement of
the local patent rules).
216. See id. at 57 ("Patent cases are complex, difficult, time consuming and expensive.
Despite the nature of these the cases, they are litigated before generalist judges and lay juries."
(quoting Improving FederalCourtAdjudication ofPatentCases:HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Kimberly Moore, Professor of Law, George Mason University))).
217. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, JusticeScalia 's "RenegadeJurisdiction": Lessonsfor Patent
Law Reform, 83 TULANE L. REv. 111, 135 (2008) (discussing the cases filed in Virginia and
California).
218. See Michael Cukor & Lisa H. Wang, New JerseyLocal PatentRules, IPFRoNTuLnE.COM,
Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=22341&deptid=4 (stating that by
adopting the local patent rules the District Court of New Jersey will become the "go to"
jurisdiction for patent litigation); see also Nguyen, supra note 217, at 134 (noting the
transformation of the Eastern District of Texas as a rocket docket for patent cases).
219. See Joe Vanden Plas, With Patents,Wisconsin Court GainingReputation as a "Rocket
Docket, " WTN NEWS,Oct. 2, 2006, http://wistechnology.com/article.php?id=3363.
220. See supra note 211.
221. See e.g., Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many PatentSuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,

2006, § 3, at 1(reporting on the Eastern District of Texas as a center for patent cases).
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223
comment on the transformation of their districts. 222 Not all comments are flattering.
Not surprisingly, those who are far away from the local control and interest do not like
to see the changes continue, as evidenced by the efforts to rein in local patent reform in
the last congressional session.224

2. Increasing Jury Participation
Most importantly, local citizens, as potential jurors in patent litigation, have the
opportunity to participate as triers of fact in patent cases because these cases are no
longer concentrated in Silicon Valley. For years, litigants have complained that it is
difficult to have a jury that understands the technology in patent cases.225 As local
citizens witness the benefits of having a district with a high volume of patent cases
filed, they welcome those cases by exhibiting their willingness to serve on jury trials
for patent cases.226 Some defendants may not like to hear about such local litigation
enthusiasm 227 They are afraid ofjury-friendly districts. 228 Their fear may overshadow

222. See e.g., id. (interviewing Judge Ward for his approach in presiding over patent cases in

the Marshall division of the Eastern District of Texas); Williams, supra note 198 (explaining
that the center of patent adjudication is a haven for patent pirates).
223. See Williams, supra note 198; see also M. Craig Tyler, PatentPiratesSearchfor Texas
Treasure, TEX. LAW., Sept. 20, 2004, at 39, available at http://www.wsgr.com/
PDFSearch/09202004_patentpirates.pdf (complaining that the courts with local patents rules
and fast calendars to trial provide the "'gun to the head' that the patent pirate needs to execute
his strategy"); Dean Takahashi, Hope for the Little Guys at the Intellectual Property
Symposium, DIGITALBEAT, Apr. 18,2008, http://digital.venturebeat.com/2008/04/18/hope-forthe-little-guys-at-the-intellectual-property-symposium/ ("In a strange way, some courts like the
federal court in the Eastern District of Texas are trying to grease the patent system by hearing
lots of patent cases.").
224. See infra Part V.
225. See generallyJanine Robben, Who Decides? Specialized Courts vs. the Jury of Peers,
OR. ST. B. BULL., Apr. 2005, at 9, available at https://www.osbar.org/publications/
bulletin/05apr/whodecides.html.

226. The increase in the number of patent cases filed in a particular district means more
resources to renovate and update old court buildings and infrastructure. Ancillary services to
accommodate litigants and witnesses bring jobs and improve the local economy. For example,
the Eastern District of Texas has a newer court building, and local businesses enjoy the
economic growth, all due to the increase of patent cases filed in the district in the past few years.
See Creswell, supra note 221.
227. Some litigants have suggested that jurors outside of metropolitan areas are not smart
enough to hear patent cases. See Tyler, supra note 223 ("Juries in East Texas, unlike those in
Houston, Dallas or Austin, are much less likely to have a member with any technical training or
education, which exacerbates the problem from the defense perspective, but makes East Texas
federal courts an attractive venue for would-be plaintiffs, who know that the jury will, instead,
gravitate toward softer or superficial issues that are difficult to predict."). Whether juries in
patent cases in districts with high concentration of patent filings are smart enough compared to
juries outsides the districts may not have much support. According to the 2004 omnibus study of
a nationwide sample of potential jurors conducted by the American Bar Association, thirty-three
percent of the respondents were not college graduates. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, JURY SERVICE: IS
FULFILLING YouR CIvIc DUTY A TRIAL? 22 (2004), availableat http://www.abanet.org/media/
releases/juryreport.pdf.
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and diminish the important contribution of engaged citizens who fulfill their duty to
serve on juries in patent cases. 229 Moreover, as our economy is more technology
dependent and as more patents will be the subject of litigation, having districts with
jurors without
aversion to sit through patent trials is a blessing for our judicial
230
system.
V. PUNISHING INNOVATIVE LOCAL REFORM
Instead of recognizing and supporting the local patent-law reform spreading across
various regions, Congress has attempted to punish the reform. Notably, Representatives
Darrell Issa and Adam Schiff cosponsored H.R. 5418 to establish a pilot program
("Pilot Program") specifically for five district courts to hear patent cases.2 3 1 Senator
Orrin Hatch introduced a similar bill in the Senate, S. 3923.232 The House then passed,
by a voice vote, an amended version of H.R. 5418.233 Subsequently, in the Senate, the
amended H.R. 5418 was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 3
As explained below, the Pilot Program is in part an effort to punish certain maverick
districts that have implemented local patent-law reform.
228. See Tyler, supra note 223.
229. The 2004 ABA study on jury service reported that Americans view jury service as an
important civic duty, and maintain a positive attitude about the responsibility. HARRIs
INTERACTIVE, supranote 227, at 5 (summarizing that "[m]ore than four in five (84%) agree that
jury duty is an important civic duty that should be fulfilled, even if it happens to be
inconvenient" and that "[s]even in ten (71%) believe they know enough to be able to serve as an
effective juror"). After the study, the ABA campaigned to promote jury duty and to encourage
potential jurors to serve. Id.
230. Jury participation was viewed so important by the ABA that the campaign to increase
jury participation was the central theme of the ABA in 2004-05. Robert Grey, Former President
of the ABA noted that courts across the country report low response rates to jury summonses.
We must take steps to move jury service into the 21 st century. We need to make it
easier for people to report for jury duty when called, make it convenient and
comfortable while they wait, aid their understanding of the evidence once they are
selected, to help them reach well-reasoned and fair verdicts, and protect their
privacy all along the way. And we must do all we can to encourage people to put
their belief in the system into action.
ABA 's Grey Finds Rewards in Issues, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
Washington, D.C.), May 2005, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mayO5ttb/interview/
index.html.
231. H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2006) (seeking "[t]o establish a pilot program in certain
United States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among
district judges"). For the current reincarnation of H.R. 5418, see House Bill 628, H.R. 628,
11 1th Cong. (2009). See also Press Release, Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator, Specter, Issa, Schiff
Introduce Legislation to Improve Patent Litigation in District Courts (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://specter.senate.gov/public/index.cfn?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&Content
Recordid=ffe2cb49-dbd6-ael3-5759-3fb54a7fae 14; Republican Study Committee, Legislative
Bulletin (Mar. 19, 2009), http://rsc.tomprice.house.gov/UploadedFiles/LB_031709
_Suspensions.pdf (stating that H.R. 628 is identical to H.R. 5418).
232. S. 3923, 109th Cong. (2006).
233. See H.R. REP. No. 109-673, at 6 (2006) (providing section-by-section analysis of H.R.
5418 and markup transcript of the House vote on H.R. 5418).
234. H.R. 5418 (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 13, 2006).
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Under the original version of H.R. 5418 and S. 3923, the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts would designate the five district
courts with the largest number of patent cases filed in the most recent calendar year to
participate in the program.235 The amended H.R. 5418, which was passed by the House
and subsequently read in the Senate, contains a limitation on the selection of district
courts for participation in the Pilot Program. 236 A district court must have at least ten
judges appointed by the President to be eligible for the designation, and at least three
judges must have requested to participate in the Pilot Program.237
In the designated district courts, a judge may keep a patent case if he or she has
requested to hear patent cases and if a patent case is subsequently and randomly
assigned to that judge. However, when a case is randomly assigned to a judge in the
designated district that has not opted to hear patent cases, that judge can either keep the
case or refer the case to judges who have opted into the Pilot Program. 238 The Pilot
last for ten years, and periodic studies will occur to determine its
Program will
9
success.

23

235. S. 3923, § 1(b) ("The Director shall make such designation from among the 15 district
courts in which the largest number of patent and plant variety protection cases were filed in the
most recent calendar year that has ended.").
236. See H.R. REP. No. 109-673, at 2.
237. H.R. 5418, § 1(b).
[E]xcept that the Director may only designate a court in which--(1) at least 10
district judges are authorized to be appointed by the President, whether under
section 133(a) of title 28, United States Code, or on a temporary basis under other
provisions of law; and (2) at least 3 judges of the court have made the request
under subsection (a)(1)(A).

Id.
238. Id. § 1(a).
(a) Establishment-(1) IN GENERAL-There is established a program, in each of
the United States district courts designated under subsection (b), under which(A) those district judges of that district court who request to hear cases under
which one or more issues arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or
plant variety protection must be decided, are designated by the chiefjudge of the
court to hear those cases; (B) cases described in subparagraph (A) are randomly
assigned to the judges of the district court, regardless of whether the judges are
designated under subparagraph (A); (C) a judge not designated under
subparagraph (A) to whom a case is assigned under subparagraph (B) may decline
to accept the case; and (D) a case declined under subparagraph (C) is randomly
reassigned to one of those judges of the court designated under subparagraph (A).

Id.
239. Id. § 1(e).
(e) Reporting to Congress-(1) IN GENERAL-At the times specified in
paragraph (2), the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, in consultation with the chief judge of each of the district courts
designated under subsection (b) and the Director of the Federal Judicial Center,
shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the pilot program
established under subsection (a). The report shall include-(A) an analysis of the
extent to which the program has succeeded in developing expertise in patent and
plant variety protection cases among the district judges of the district courts so
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H.R. 5418 also contains a provision for training judges relating to patents and for
the compensation of law clerks with expertise in technical matters arising in patent
cases.240 The authorized amount for each fiscal year is at least five million dollars. 24 '
The House Report accompanying H.R. 5418 explains that there is a need for the
legislation; it claims patent litigation has become too costly because federal district
judges are generalists.242 Generalist judges are not equipped to handle the novelty and

designated; (B) an analysis of the extent to which the program has improved the
efficiency of the courts involved by reason of such expertise; (C) with respect to
patent cases handled by the judges designated pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) and
judges not so designated, a comparison between the 2 groups of judges with
respect to-(i) the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
of such cases on the issues of claim construction and substantive patent law; and
(ii) the period of time elapsed from the date on which a case is filed to the date on
which trial begins or summary judgment is entered; (D) a discussion of any
evidence indicating that litigants select certain of the judicial districts designated
under subsection (b) in an attempt to ensure a given outcome; and (E) an analysis
of whether the pilot program should be extended to other district courts, or should
be made permanent and apply to all district courts.
(2) TIMETABLE FOR REPORTS- The times referred to in paragraph (1) are(A) not later than the date that is 5 years and 3 months after the end of the 6-month
period described in subsection (b); and (B) not later than 5 years after the date
described in subparagraph (A). (3) PERIODIC REPORTING- The Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in consultation with the chief
judge of each of the district courts designated under subsection (b) and the
Director of the Federal Judicial Center, shall keep the committees referred to in
paragraph (1) informed, on a periodic basis while the pilot program is in effect,
with respect to the matters referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of
paragraph (1).

Id.
240. Id. § I(f).
241. Id.
(f) Authorization for Training and Clerkships- In addition to any other funds made
available to carry out this section, there is authorized to be appropriated not less
than $5,000,000 in each fiscal year for-(1) educational and professional
development of those district judges designated under subsection (a)(1)(A) in
matters relating to patents and plant variety protection; and (2) compensation of
law clerks with expertise in technical matters arising in patent and plant variety
protection cases, to be appointed by the courts designated under subsection (b) to
assist those courts in such cases.

Id.
242. H.R. REP. No. 109-673, at 4. House Report 109-673 explained:
Patent cases constitute an insubstantial number of the total cases filed. Of that
amount, the overwhelming majority of cases are typically settled or decided by
motion with the rest, approximately 100 cases, going to trial in a given year. Due
to their novelty and complexity, the cases that are tried tend to be resourceintensive and account for a disproportionate share of district court judges' time and
effort. As with other civil and criminal cases, the standard practice is to randomly
assign patent cases to the various judges within a district.
Given this background-the relative infrequency of patent litigation, early
settlement of most suits, and random assignment of cases-district court judges
generally receive little exposure to actual patent claim trials.
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complexity of patent cases. 243 Consequently, the reversal rate of the district judges'
decisions on patent cases by the Federal Circuit is high.2 " Some judges and other
commentators, however, have challenged the problems identified and have argued the
statistics relied on by the House in passing H.R. 5418 were inaccurate and
exaggerated.245
H.R. 5418, if it were to become law, would punish the local patent-reform
movement. Under the bill, the Southern District of New York will be qualified to
receive the funding. 246 Why should the Southern District of New York be monetarily
Id.
243. Id. at 5.
According to Kimberly A. Moore,

. ..

the author of an article entitled, "Are

District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?," "district court judges
improperly construe patent claim terms in 33 percent of the cases appealed to the
Federal Circuit." This national reversal rate contrasts dramatically with the less
than 10 percent overall reversal rate for all other types of cases, both civil and
criminal, which are reviewed by the regional Courts of Appeals.
Further, Professor Moore has reported that her "data show that errors in district
court claim constructions require reversing or vacating judgments in 81 percent of
these cases." She goes on to suggest that the adjudication system would be
improved if an expedited appeal of claim construction issues could be provided to
the CAFC rather than requiring district judges to proceed with a lengthy and
expensive patent litigation that is premised on a "frequently erroneous claim
construction."
Id.
244. See id. But see Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Oversight
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualProperty of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49-51 (2005) [hereinafter Improving Adjudication
Hearing] (statement of T.S. Ellis, III, J., United States District Court, Eastern District of
Virginia) (explaining that based on his experience as a federal judge and litigator, the reversal
rate in patent cases actually is substantially smaller than the rates presented at the oversight
hearing).
245. See Paul M. Schoenhard, Judging Trial Judges: Despite What Professor Kimberly
Moore Told Congress in October, There Is No Need for Specialized PatentJudges, INTELL.
PROP. L. & Bus., Mar. 2006, at 22-24 ("The establishment of a specialized patent judiciary at
the federal district court level would be an inefficient solution to a nonexistent problem .... On
appeal, federal district court judges fare no worse in patent cases then in nonpatent cases ....
Moore offered no evidence that specialized patent judges in the United States would perform
any better."). There is a pervasive perception that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reverses district court rulings in patent cases at an inordinately high rate. This view has led to a
mounting cry for specialized patent judges in each of this nation's ninety-four federal district
courts. See Improving AdjudicationHearing,supranote 244, at 49-51 (statement of T.S. Ellis,
III, J.); Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States DesignateSpecialistPatent TrialJudges?An
EmpiricalAnalysis of H.R. 628 in Light of The English Experience and the Work of Professor
Moore, 10 COLUM. Scl. & TECH L. REv. 169, 170 (2009), http://www.stlr.org/volumes/volumex-2008-2009/gitter.

246. The Northern District of California, the Central District of California, the Southern
District of New York, the Northern District of Illinois, and the District of New Jersey will be
qualified under H.R. 5418's requirements because they are among the top districts with high
patent cases and each of the districts has more than ten judges. See FAQs About Judges
Procedure's and Schedules, http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/JudgeReq.nsf/FAQs+about

+Judges'+Procedures+and+Schedules?OpenView (Central District of California with thirty-four
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rewarded under H.R. 5418 when the judges and local patent bar association in that
district have not worked together to adopt a comprehensive set of local patent rules?
Why should districts with strong participation in the local patent-reform movement,
such as the Western District of Pennsylvania, the District of Minnesota, the District of
Georgia, and Eastern District of Texas, be excluded? It seems that the bill does not
recognize the local efforts ofjudges and bar associations in regions that have adopted
the local patent rules. The judges and local bar associations in these districts have
taken proactive steps to inform the nation that they welcome patent cases and that they
have sound methods to manage patent cases, reduce litigation abuses, reduce length of
disposition, and reduce litigation costs. For example, the judges of the Western District
of Pennsylvania worked together with the practicing bar to adopt a set of local patent
rules because that district strongly desired to become an adjudicate center for patent
cases. 24 7 Similarly, the District of Massachusetts and the District of Minnesota have
adopted similar local patent rules to signal litigants that they welcomed patent cases,
and that the judges are not afraid of the complexities of patent litigation. The
designation requirements of the Pilot Program essentially ignore these district courts
for taking initiative in adopting new local rules for case management, predictability,
and efficiency. Their efforts are not being recognized under H.R. 5418.248
Additionally, H.R. 5418 punishes local patent reform across the United States,
because the bill, with the exception of the Northern District of Illinois, selectively
rewards districts located on the East Coast (New York and New Jers ey) and West
Coast (California). The bill ignores the local efforts in other regions. The bill
perpetuates the concentration ofjudicial expertise in the large districts along the coasts,
forgetting that judges in the rest of the nation should have an opportunity to develop
their expertise in patent cases.
Lastly, the Pilot Program selectively excludes district courts already possessing
patent-law expertise. Based on the 2006 fiscal year report for the number of patent
cases filed in district courts, the top five districts were the Eastern District of Texas, the
District of Delaware, the District of New Jersey, the Northern District of California,
and the Central District of California. 249 Except for the Eastern District of Texas and

district judges); United States District Court, Northern District of California, http://
www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/judges.nsf/0310082dc8b4b3f388256d48005ed6c5?OpenView

(Northern District of California with eighteen district judges); Northern District of Illinois
Judges, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/ home/Judges.aspx. (Northern District of Illinois with
thirty-two district judges); U.S. District Court of New Jersey, http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/
(District of New Jersey with twenty-four district judges); U.S. District Judges, http://
wwwl.nysd.uscourts.gov/judges.php?show=district (Southern District of New York with forty-

four district judges). See Nguyen, supra note 217, at 131 (providing a table of top ten districts
with patent cases).
247. Henry M. Sneath, Fast Track PatentLitigation: Toward More ProceduralCertainty
and Cost Control, 73 DEF. CouNs. J. 201, 201 (2006) (stating that the Western District of
Pennsylvania is among the district courts with new local patent rules to make their districts
"patent friendly" and to "draw, over time, a larger share of the regional and national patent
litigation claims").
248. Of the five top districts, only the Eastern District of Texas and Northern District of
California have fully adopted local patent rules. See supra Part IV.A.
249. See supranote 211; see also Nguyen, supra note 217, at 131 (listing the top ten districts
for patent filings during September 2005 and September 2006).
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the District of Delaware, each district contained more than ten district judges. 25 0 The
Eastern District of Texas has only eight judges and the District of Delaware has only
five judges.2 5 ' That means both the Eastern District of Texas and the District of
Delaware would not be designated district courts under H.R. 5418 even though they
were among the five district courts with the largest number of patent cases filed in
2006.
The Eastern District of Texas, having judges with expertise for patent cases,
expertise in patent law, enthusiasm for patent law, and special local rules for managing
patent cases efficiently, would be excluded. 252 The imposition of the ten-judge
requirement, and the requirement of having the most patent cases filed in the most
recent calendar year, is arbitrary and overflowing with interest group influence. The
imposition ofthe ten-judge requirement was not in the original version of H.R. 5418. 253
The various interest groups' lobbying efforts blamed the Eastern District of Texas for
the ills of the patent system and exerted their influence to change the original version
of H.R. 5418 to exclude the Eastern District of Texas by adding the ten-judge
requirement. The Eastern District will remain a popular district for litigants to file their
patent cases because the judges in the district
have strong patent expertise and the
254
desire and aptitude to hear patent cases.

250. See supra note 246.
251. The eight judges of the Eastern District of Texas are Chief Judge Folsom and Judges

Clark, Crone, Davis, Heartfield, Schell, Schneider, and Ward. United States District Court,
Eastern District of Texas, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov. The five judges of the District of
Delaware are Murray M. Schwartz, Joseph J. Longobardi, Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., Sue L.
Robinson, and Gregory M. Sleet. U.S. District Judges, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/
HistMain.htm.
252. See Nguyen, supra note 217 (explaining how the Eastern District of Texas has
innovatively transformed itself into a destination for patent expertise with knowledgeable judges
welcoming patent cases and efficient management calendar system especially for patent
litigation to deliver swift results, avoid cost, and reduce delay tactics employed by lawyers).
253. See H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. § 1(b) (2006) (as introduced to the House, May, 18,2006).
(b) Designation- The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall, not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act,
designate not less than 5 United States district courts, in at least 3 different judicial
circuits, in which the program established under subsection (a) will be carried out.
The Director shall make such designation from among the 15 district courts in
which the largest number of patent and plant variety protection cases was filed in
the most recent calendar year that has ended.
Id.
254. Recent Federal Circuit decisions, such as In re Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 566 F.3d
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008), on change
of venue and forum non conveniens, directed the Eastern District to transfer patent cases out of
the district. These decisions, however, will not have much impact in reality. Cf Erin Coe, Texas
Hang-Ups May Boost Patent Suits in Delaware, LAw360, May 29, 2009,
http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/20e922l d-6d32-48e9-9dec-03bddab3558b/Presenta
tion/PublicationAttachmentlef66aa66-177b-4bf9-b7e5062f22935t93/IPLaw360_PatentSuits.pdf

(noting that despite the recent rulings on patent litigation transfers, some "practitioners said the
Eastern District of Texas would continue to be a leader inhandling patent infringement cases
because it has a number ofjudges experienced in hearing patent cases and its patent local rules
provide parties with a predictable schedule"). Furthermore, to reduce the chance for transfer,
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These congressional efforts to quash and dispirit successful local patent reform are
an example of politicization and failure. Congress should encourage, not discourage
and punish, maverick districts and judges that are central to patent-law reform in
regions across the United States.
CONCLUSION

The successful local patent-law-reform movement highlights the role of localities as
laboratories and agents for change that impacts both local and national levels. The
successful results from judges and local bar associations working together to control
patent litigation, curb tactical abuses, reduce costs, deliver swift justice, and enhance
judicial expertise in patent cases demonstrates why true patent reformers should
recognize the positive steps taken by the local level forge a major national overhaul of
the patent system. Reform at the local level is even more important given that Congress
has not been able to revamp the patent system in the last couple of years, and the
Supreme Court is unpredictable in its injection into patent reform. Local patent reform
is an example of dynamic federalism at work.

"patent owners are already employing certain strategies to keep their cases in the Eastern
District of Texas from getting transferred. Over the law few months, multiple defendants have
been rounded up in infringement suits filed in the Eastern District of Texas by Hospital Systems
Corp., Actus LLC, Cityhub.com Inc., Fractus SA, Phoenix Licensing LLC, Web Telephony
LLC and Sepracor Inc., among others." Id.

